[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
(Страсбург, 25 апреля 1983 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявитель, гражданин Турции, родившийся в 1937 г., был осужден
участковым судом Хейлбронна 30 апреля 1976 г. и приговорен к
тюремному заключению за участие в торговле наркотиками. Его
адвокат г-н Вингертер обратился с жалобой в порядке ревизии в
Федеральную судебную палату - высшую судебную инстанцию. В жалобе
он указал на ряд процессуальных нарушений, в том числе статьи 146
Уголовно-процессуального кодекса, который запрещает адвокату
защищать обвиняемого, если ранее он защищал одного из его
соучастников. Таким образом, г-н Вингертер указал как на
процессуальное нарушение свое собственное участие в процессе.
Однако в принятии жалобы к рассмотрению было отказано, поскольку
она была подана адвокатом, не имевшим право представлять
заявителя.
После того как ревизионная жалоба была подана другим адвокатом,
г-ном Раушенбушем, она была принята к рассмотрению. Однако палата
по уголовным делам Федерального суда отказалась допустить его к
слушанию дела, поскольку он участвовал в процессе Пакелли в
качестве защитника другого обвиняемого. Палата отказалась
назначить г-ну Пакелли официального защитника, поскольку законом
для рассмотрения дела в высшей судебной инстанции такое назначение
не предусмотрено, а в слушании может участвовать сам г-н Пакелли.
Последний к этому времени был освобожден из тюрьмы и вернулся в
Турцию. Он утверждал, что не имеет финансовых возможностей быть
представленным другим адвокатом. В результате дело слушалось в
отсутствие г-на Пакелли и адвоката и в удовлетворении жалобы было
отказано.
Г-н Пакелли подал жалобу в Федеральный Конституционный Суд в
январе 1978 г. В постановлении, вынесенном 10 мая, коллегия из
трех судей приняла решение не принимать жалобу к рассмотрению как
не имеющую достаточных перспектив успешного разрешения.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию в октябре 1978 г., г-н Пакелли
утверждал, что отказ суда назначить ему официального защитника
нарушил его право на справедливое разбирательство на основе
состязательности (статья 6 п. 1 Конвенции) и его право на
бесплатную юридическую помощь (статья 6 п. 3 "c").
7 мая 1981 г. Комиссия объявила жалобу частично приемлемой. В
своем докладе от 12 декабря 1981 г. она выразила мнение, что имело
место нарушение статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (единогласно) и что выяснять,
имело ли место также и нарушение статьи 6 п. 1, не требуется
(одиннадцатью голосами против одного).
Дело было передано в Суд Комиссией и Правительством
Федеративной Республики Германии соответственно 14 и 24 мая 1982
г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
29. Заявитель жаловался на отказ палаты по уголовным делам
Федерального суда назначить г-на Раушенбуша его официальным
адвокатом на слушаниях 29 ноября 1977 г. по его ревизионной жалобе
в суде; он утверждал, что такой отказ представляет собой нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "c" Конвенции.
Никем не оспаривалось, что эти нормы применимы к настоящему
случаю, и Суд отмечает этот факт установленным (см. mutatis
mutandis Решение по делу Делькура от 17 января 1970 г. Серия A, т.
11, с. 13 - 15, п. 25 и 26, а также Решение по делу Артико от 13
мая 1980 г. Серия A, т. 37, с. 15 - 18, п. 31 - 38). Однако
Правительство справедливо указало, что то, как следует применять
эти нормы, зависит от особенностей конкретного процесса, о котором
идет речь (см. вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу Делькура,
там же).
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
30. Статья 6 п. 3 "c"
"Каждый человек, обвиняемый в совершении уголовного
преступления, имеет как минимум следующие права:
...
c) защищать себя лично или через посредство выбранного им самим
защитника или, если у него нет достаточных средств для оплаты
услуг защитника, иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно, когда
того требуют интересы правосудия;
... "
На слушаниях в Комиссии Правительство утверждало, что статья 6
п. 3 "c" не требует предоставления бесплатной правовой помощи в
данном случае, так как г-н Пакелли мог бы лично явиться на
слушание дела в Федеральной судебной палате. В Суде Правительство
не останавливалось на этом вопросе подробно, но повторило, что
заявитель мог бы сам представить свое дело в Федеральном суде.
31. Статья 6 п. 3 "c" гарантирует лицу, обвиненному в
совершении уголовного преступления, три права: защищать себя
лично; иметь выбранного им самим защитника и, при определенных
условиях, иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно. В английском
тексте для установления связи между соответствующими выражениями в
каждом случае используется разделительный союз "или"; с другой
стороны, во французском тексте эквивалент данного союза - "ou" -
используется только для соединения фраз, излагающих первое и
второе право, а между вторым и третьим стоит союз "и". В
подготовительных работах трудно найти объяснение этим
лингвистическим различиям. Единственное, что они показывают, это
то, что в процессе заключительного рассмотрения проекта Конвенции
накануне ее подписания комитет экспертов внес "некоторое число
формальных исправлений и исправлений перевода", включая замену
союза "и" на союз "или" в английском варианте статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
(Recueil des Travaux {Preparatoires} <*>, т. IV, с. 1010).
Учитывая предмет и цель данного пункта, назначение которого
состоит в том, чтобы обеспечить эффективную защиту прав на защиту
(см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с. 16,
п. 33; см. также mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Адольфа от 26
марта 1982 г. Серия A, т. 49, с. 15, п. 30, и Решение по делу
"Санди таймс" от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 30, п. 48),
французский текст служит здесь более надежным ориентиром; Суд
согласен с Комиссией по данному вопросу. Соответственно "каждый
обвиняемый в совершении уголовного преступления", кто не желает
защищать себя лично, должен иметь возможность прибегнуть к услугам
выбранного им самим защитника; если у него нет достаточных средств
для оплаты такого защитника, то, на основании Конвенции, защитник
должен быть ему предоставлен бесплатно, когда того требуют
интересы правосудия.
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Таким образом, г-н Пакелли, хотя германское право и разрешало
ему лично предстать перед Федеральным судом, мог требовать
предоставления ему юридической помощи в той мере, в какой это
удовлетворяло условиям, установленным в статье 6 п. 3 "c".
A. Отсутствие достаточных средств для оплаты защитника
32. Доводы Правительства сводились к следующему. Нет ничего,
что бы подтверждало утверждение заявителя о том, что у него нет
достаточных средств для оплаты выбранного им самим защитника;
наоборот, он сам заявил в участковом суде, что он очень прилично
зарабатывал в Федеративной Республике Германии; согласно
констатирующей части Судебного решения от 30 апреля 1976 г. (см.
п. 11 выше), он также зарабатывал деньги, торгуя наркотиками;
кроме того, вскоре после возвращения в Турцию он открыл свое дело.
Комиссия считала, что Правительство не вправе оспаривать
утверждения заявителя на данной стадии. Она отметила также, что
немецкое право не связывает с неплатежеспособностью предоставление
бесплатного защитника лицу, оказавшемуся под судом. Кроме того, г-
н Раушенбуш предложил до слушания представить сертификат о статусе
бедности (см. п. 16 выше), но Федеральный суд не принял это
предложение.
33. Суд не может согласиться с Комиссией по этому вопросу.
Вопрос о средствах г-на Пакелли не играл никакой роли в обжалуемом
решении: отказ в просьбе о назначении г-на Раушенбуша основывался
исключительно на том факте, что, по мнению председателя уголовной
палаты Федерального суда, данный случай не подпадал под ту
категорию дел, где в соответствии с немецким правом помощь
защитника была обязательной (см. п. 16 выше). Соответственно
Правительство не утратило в контексте статьи 6 п. 3 "c" права
оспаривать перед учреждениями Конвенции утверждение заявителя, что
он был беден.
34. Тем не менее следует признать, что и было сделано делегатом
Комиссии, что сегодня практически невозможно доказать, что в 1977
г. у г-на Пакелли не было средств для оплаты своего защитника.
Есть лишь некоторые признаки того, что это было именно так. Нет
никаких причин предполагать, что г-н Раушенбуш не смог бы получить
вышеупомянутый сертификат; в этой связи следует отметить, что его
клиент провел под стражей в Федеративной Республике Германии два
года до его возвращения в Турцию в 1976 г. (см. п. 15 и 19 выше).
Кроме того, г-н Пакелли представил в Комиссию заявление об
имущественном положении и справки от компетентных турецких
властей, основанные на декларации о доходах и имуществе,
представленной им при уплате налогов за предыдущий год; из этих
документов явствует, что он занимался бизнесом в небольших
масштабах и его финансовое положение было весьма скромным. Эти
данные - которые, более того, не оспаривались Правительством -
побудили Комиссию предоставить ему бесплатную юридическую помощь
(см. п. 27 выше).
Конечно, этих частностей недостаточно, чтобы доказать вне
всяких сомнений, что в рассматриваемый период времени заявитель
был неплатежеспособен; однако, учитывая его предложение
Федеральному суду доказать, что у него нет средств, и в отсутствие
четких подтверждений противного, Суд склонен рассматривать первое
из двух условий, содержащихся в статье 6 п. 3 "c", как
выполненное.
B. Интересы правосудия
35. Согласно мнению заявителя и Комиссии, интересы правосудия
требовали, чтобы г-н Раушенбуш был официально назначен адвокатом
заявителя на слушаниях в Федеральном суде от 29 ноября 1977 г.
Оспаривая эту точку зрения, Правительство выделило следующие
моменты. У г-на Пакелли был защитник на той стадии письменного
производства; что касается слушаний, то их предмет был ограничен
основанием принесения жалобы по вопросам права: Судебное решение
от 30 апреля 1976 г. оспаривалось единственно по причине
предполагаемых процессуальных ошибок, заявитель не мог выдвигать
новых жалоб и дополнять свой меморандум, в котором излагались
основания для жалобы, ссылками на другие факты. В ходе слушаний
речь могла идти только об аргументах и выводах юридического
характера. Затронутые проблемы не являлись сложными, и вынесенное
по ним решение не могло повлечь серьезные последствия. Кроме того,
г-н Пакелли мог бы явиться на суд лично. И наконец, Комиссия
неправильно представляет себе роль федеральной прокуратуры при
рассмотрении жалоб по вопросам права. Она с совершенно независимых
позиций изучает мотивировку жалобы и следит за согласованным
применением закона и единообразием судебной практики; таким
образом, эта задача очень близка той роли, которую выполняет
Генеральный прокурор при Кассационном суде Бельгии (см.
вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу Делькура).
36. Суд, как это ранее сделала Комиссия, отмечает, что, во-
первых, это был один из тех редких случаев, когда Федеральный суд
проводил слушания: в уголовных делах это происходит только в
десяти процентах жалоб по вопросам права (см. п. 23 выше). Тем не
менее в данном случае Федеральный суд практически оказался
обязанным провести устное разбирательство, т.к. жалоба была
приемлемой, а прокуратура не требовала отклонить ее как явно плохо
обоснованную (статья 349 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса; см. п.
23 выше). Это показывает, что слушание могло бы иметь существенное
значение для вынесения решения. Поэтому для обеспечения
справедливого судебного разбирательства принцип состязательности
приобретал важное значение.
37. Федеральному суду предстояло вынести решение только по
вопросам, на которые указал, а позднее подробно изложил в своей
жалобе заявитель (см. п. 13 выше), а он ограничился лишь указанием
на процессуальные ошибки (статья 344 з 2 и статья 352 з 1 Уголовно-
процессуального кодекса). Если бы его адвокат участвовал в
слушании, г-н Пакелли получил бы возможность обосновать свои
жалобы, представить, в случае необходимости, дополнительные
подробности и развить свои письменные аргументы. Он смог бы,
например, прокомментировать изложение дела судьей - докладчиком
(статья 351 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса; см. п. 25 выше).
Возможность выступления в ходе судебного слушания представляла
большую ценность, поскольку жалоба - весьма объемный документ -
затрагивала девятнадцать различных вопросов.
Как справедливо указала Комиссия, один из содержавшихся в
жалобе вопросов касался применения новой версии статьи 146
Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Третья палата по уголовным делам
Федерального суда ранее, в 1976 г., вынесла решение, что жалоба по
вопросам права, основывающаяся на данной статье, не может быть
успешной, если только защита одним адвокатом нескольких обвиняемых
фактически мешала бы интересам защиты (см. п. 26 выше). Г-н
Раушенбуш не оспаривал такое толкование. Однако он стремился
показать, что в данном деле имел место конфликт интересов. Кроме
того, можно было предвидеть, что Судебное решение, которое
собирался вынести Федеральный суд, было бы немаловажным для
развития судебной практики, которое - и это также признало
Правительство - остановилось после вынесения Судебного решения от
29 ноября 1977 г., которым была отклонена жалоба заявителя. В этой
связи толкование статьи 146 в ходе устных прений представляло бы
определенный интерес.
38. Само собой разумеется, что в подобных обстоятельствах
личное присутствие заявителя не смогло бы компенсировать
отсутствия его адвоката: без услуг практикующего юриста г-н
Пакелли не смог бы внести полезный вклад в рассмотрение
возникающих правовых вопросов и, в частности, по статье 146
Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Суд разделяет мнение Комиссии по
данному вопросу.
39. И наконец, самое главное: судебное разбирательство жалобы
по настоящему делу не было состязательным, во всяком случае на
стадии устных слушаний. Даже на этапе письменного разбирательства
только одна служба прокурора при участковом суде Хейлбронна
представила возражения на жалобу, поданную г-ном Пакелли, который
в то время еще был представлен г-ном Раушенбушем, но и она не дала
ответ по существу оснований, приведенных в жалобе (см. п. 14
выше). Относительно федеральной прокуратуры - какой бы ни была ее
роль на кассационной стадии - германское право позволяло заявителю
оспаривать ее письменные представления (статья 349 з 3 Уголовно-
процессуального кодекса; см. п. 23 выше). Соответственно, если бы
Федеральный суд не принял решение провести слушания, федеральная
прокуратура представила бы свои выводы в письменном виде и
сообщила о них заявителю, а последний, на что он справедливо
указал, получил бы возможность изучить их и, в случае
необходимости, ответить на них.
Подобная возможность опровергнуть доводы прокуратуры во время
слушаний должна была быть также предоставлена и г-ну Пакелли.
Отказавшись назначить ему защитника на устной стадии судебного
разбирательства, Федеральный суд лишил его возможности оказать
влияние на исход дела, возможности, которую он бы сохранил, если
бы процесс целиком был письменным.
40. В подобных обстоятельствах Суд, как и Комиссия, считает,
что интересы правосудия требовали, чтобы заявителю была
предоставлена помощь защитника в ходе слушаний в Федеральном суде.
C. Вывод
41. Соответственно имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
Конвенции.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
42. Применительно к тем же самым фактам заявитель ссылался
также на статью 6 п. 1, которая гласит:
"Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей или при рассмотрении любого уголовного
обвинения, предъявляемого ему, на справедливое и публичное
разбирательство дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
судом, созданным на основании закона. Судебное решение объявляется
публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на судебные
заседания в течение всего процесса или его части по соображениям
морали, общественного порядка или государственной безопасности в
демократическом обществе, а также когда того требуют интересы
несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни сторон, или - в
той мере, в какой это, по мнению суда, строго необходимо - при
особых обстоятельствах, когда гласность нарушала бы интересы
правосудия".
Правительство не выдвинуло каких-либо отдельных доводов по
данной проблеме.
Соглашаясь с Комиссией, Суд хотел бы напомнить, что норма
статьи 6 п. 3 "c" представляет собой конкретное применение общего
принципа справедливого судебного разбирательства, изложенного в п.
1 (см. Решение по делу Девеера от 27 февраля 1980 г. Серия A, т.
35, с. 30, п. 56). Соответственно, вопрос о том, был ли соблюден
п. 1, не имеет реального значения для дела заявителя; он
поглощается вопросом о том, были ли выполнены требования п. 3 "c".
Установление нарушения требований п. 3 "c" избавляет Суд от
необходимости рассмотрения данного дела в свете п. 1 (см. mutatis
mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Девеера. Серия A, т. 35,
с. 30 - 31, п. 56).
III. Применение статьи 50
43. Г-н Пакелли потребовал справедливого удовлетворения на
основании статьи 50. Прежде всего он просил Суд аннулировать
Решение Федерального суда от 29 ноября 1977 г. и дать указание
Правительству выразить официальное неодобрение некоторых
содержащихся в нем пассажей, которые он рассматривал как
расистские или дискриминационные, а потому неприемлемые. Во-
вторых, он просил выплатить ему справедливое возмещение, которое
Суд сочтет подобающим, за причиненный моральный вред. И наконец,
он потребовал возмещения издержек и расходов, связанных с
судопроизводством в Федеральном Конституционном Суде, которые он
определил в размере 668,96 немецкой марки.
44. В представлении Правительства утверждалось, что эти
разнообразные требования должны быть отвергнуты. Оно настаивало,
что отказ Федерального суда назначить ему официального адвоката
нисколько не повредил заявителю и что его критика причин, по
которым суд вынес такое решение, была необоснованна. Относительно
издержек и расходов по обращению в Конституционный Суд,
Правительство не считало установленным то, что г-н Пакелли
вынужден был их нести; оно заявило также, что требуемая сумма не
совсем точно соответствует шкале ставок, применявшихся в
рассматриваемый период времени.
45. Суд считает, что в данных обстоятельствах вопрос готов для
решения (первое предложение статьи 50 п. 3 Регламента Суда).
Суд отмечает в отношении первого требования, что он на
основании Конвенции не уполномочен ни отменять Судебные решения
Федерального суда, ни давать Правительству указания дезавуировать
те выдержки из него, на которые жалуется заявитель (см. mutatis
mutandis Решение по делу Маркс от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A, т. 31,
с. 25, п. 58, и Решение по делу Даджена от 24 февраля 1983 г.
Серия A, т. 59, с. 8, п. 15). Не выражая какого-либо мнения по
поводу данных выдержек, Суд полагает, что их наличие не может
рассматриваться как следствие нарушения статьи 6 п. 3 "c".
46. Как справедливо указало Правительство, г-н Вингертер не
только не доказал наличие морального вреда, но и не указал, в чем
он заключался. Нет ничего, что бы показывало, что отсутствие
защитника вызвало у г-на Пакелли давящее ощущение изоляции,
замешательства и чувства покинутости (см. вышеупомянутое Решение
по делу Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с. 21, п. 47); эта версия кажется
маловероятной, так как уже в августе 1976 г. он вернулся в Турцию.
Во всяком случае установление факта нарушения настоящим Решением
уже представляет собой достаточную компенсацию за якобы понесенный
моральный вред (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Ле Конта, Ван
Левена и Де Мейера от 18 октября 1982 г. Серия A, т. 54, с. 8, п.
16).
47. Издержки и расходы, о возмещении которых идет речь, были
понесены с тем, чтобы Федеральный Конституционный Суд исправил
нарушения требований статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (см. вышеупомянутое Решение
по делу Даджена. Серия A, т. 59, с. 9, п. 20). Более того, это не
оспаривалось и Правительством. Однако Правительство утверждало,
что эти расходы нес защитник заявителя, а не он сам, так как г-н
Вингертер отказался от вознаграждения и, более того, по причине
пропуска срока исковой давности он утратил право на взыскание
долга.
И действительно, до сих пор г-н Пакелли не заплатил своему
адвокату за представительство его интересов в Федеральном
Конституционном Суде: г-н Вингертер не направлял ему счет за
оказанные услуги до 7 февраля 1982 г., и, как он заявляет, это
было сделано для того, чтобы отсрочить оплату вознаграждения с
учетом финансовых трудностей заявителя. В памятной записке,
направленной в Комиссию 16 февраля 1982 г., г-н Вингертер указал,
что он не получил еще какой-либо платы за услуги, оказанные в ходе
судебного разбирательства, о котором идет речь, и не просил о
таковых, так как он знал, что у его клиента нет средств.
Тем не менее ни эти заявления, ни другие документы,
представленные в Суд, не показывают с достаточной четкостью, что
имел место отказ от права получения вознаграждения. И в самом
деле, как справедливо указал делегат Комиссии, неудивительно, что
г-н Вингертер, зная финансовое положение своего клиента, решил не
выставлять ему счет за проделанную работу на более ранней стадии
(см. Решение по делу X против Соединенного Королевства от 18
октября 1982 г. Серия A, т. 55, с. 18, п. 24). Суд хотел бы
указать, как это уже было сделано делегатом Комиссии, что в делах
о правах человека адвокат, оказывая помощь тому, кто не в
состоянии сразу ему заплатить, действует во всеобщем интересе.
Относительно довода, основанного на истечении срока исковой
давности на право г-на Вингертера взыскать причитающийся ему долг,
это не вопрос публичного порядка, и здесь следует положиться на
решение самого г-на Пакелли.
Принимая решение на основе справедливости, Суд находит, что
сумма в 668,96 немецкой марки, требуемая в порядке компенсации за
услуги защитника и за расходы, является разумной.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
Конвенции;
2. Постановил, что рассматривать данное дело на основании
статьи 6 п. 1 нет необходимости;
3. Постановил, что государство - ответчик должно выплатить
заявителю за понесенные им юридические издержки и расходы сумму в
размере шестисот шестидесяти восьми немецких марок и девяноста
шести пфеннигов (DM 668,96), и отвергает оставшуюся часть
требования о справедливом возмещении.
Совершено на английском и французском языках, причем
французский текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце прав
человека в Страсбурге 25 апреля 1983 г.
Председатель
Жерар ВИАРДА
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF PAKELLI v. GERMANY
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 25.IV.1983)
In the Pakelli case,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court <*>, as a Chamber
composed of the following judges:
-------------------------------
<*> Note by the registry: In the version of the Rules
applicable when proceedings were instituted. A revised version of
the Rules of Court entered into force on 1 January 1983, but only
in respect of cases referred to the Court after that date.
Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
Mr. R. Ryssdal,
Mr. L. Liesch,
Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr. B. Walsh,
Mr. R. Bernhardt,
Mr. J. Gersing,
and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 26 November 1982 and on 23
March 1983,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The present case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany ("the Government"). The case
originated in an application (no. 8398/78) against that State
lodged with the Commission on 5 October 1978 under Article 25
(art. 25) of the Convention by a Turkish national, Mr. {Lutfu}
Pakelli.
2. The Commission's request and the Government's application
were lodged with the registry of the Court within the period of
three months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1,
art. 47) - the former on 14 May and the latter on 24 May 1982. The
request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to
the declaration whereby the Federal Republic of Germany recognised
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46);
its purpose was to obtain a decision as to whether or not there
had been a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under
Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c). The application invited the
Court to hold that there had been no such breach.
3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as
ex officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German
nationality (Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention), and Mr. G.
Wiarda, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court). On 28 May 1982, the President drew by lot, in the
presence of the Registrar, the names of the five other members,
namely Mr. R. Ryssdal, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. L. Liesch, {Mr. E. Garcia
de Enterria} and Mr. B. Walsh (Article 43 (art. 43) in fine of the
Convention and Rule 21 para. 4). Subsequently, Mr. L.-E. Pettiti
and Mr. J. Gersing, substitute judges, took the place of Mr. Zekia
and {Mr. Garcia de Enterria}, who were prevented from taking part
in the consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para.
1).
4. Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of the
Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar, the
views of the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the
Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. On 9 June 1982,
having particular regard to their concurring statements, he
concluded that there was no need for memorials to be filed. After
consulting, through the Deputy Registrar, the Agent of the
Government and the Delegate of the Commission, the President
directed on 4 October that the oral proceedings should open on 25
November 1982.
On 2 November, the Registrar, on the President's instructions,
requested the Commission and the Government to produce several
documents; these were received on 5, 22 and 23 November.
5. The hearings were held in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on 25 November. Immediately before they
opened, the Chamber had held a preparatory meeting; it had
authorised the Agent and the advocates of the Government and the
person assisting the Delegate of the Commission to use the German
language (Rule 27 paras. 2 and 3).
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government:
Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Agent,
Mr. P. Riess, Ministerialrat at the Federal Ministry of
Justice,
Mr. W. Stiller, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Advisers;
- for the Commission:
Mr. J.A. Frowein, Delegate,
Mr. N. Wingerter, the applicant's lawyer before the Commission,
assisting the Delegate (Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence, of the
Rules of Court).
The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier and Mr. Riess for the
Government and by Mr. Frowein and Mr. Wingerter for the
Commission, as well as their replies to its questions. On 26
November, in response to a request which he had made on the
instructions of the President, the Registrar received certain
documents from the Commission.
6. On 20 December, the Commission transmitted to the Court the
applicant's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention.
In accordance with the Orders and directions of the President,
the registry received the following documents on this issue:
- on 20 January 1983, the comments of the Government;
- on 9 and 10 February 1983, the observations of the Delegate
of the Commission and, through him, the observations of the
applicant.
THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
7. Mr. Pakelli, a Turkish national born in 1937, is currently
living in Turkey; he was resident in the Federal Republic of
Germany from 1964 to 1976.
8. The applicant arrived in the Federal Republic in February
1964 and was engaged by the firm of Audi-NSU at Neckarsulm. He
stayed there for two and a half years. Subsequently, he had a
succession of different occupations: mechanic in another firm at
Neckarsulm, manager of a restaurant, independent insurance and
building-loans broker. The last-mentioned activity, which
consisted of negotiating and concluding, for example, life-
insurance and savings contracts with Turkish workers, provided
him, as he himself stated, with a very good monthly income.
9. On 31 May 1972, the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht)
imposed on him a suspended sentence of ten months' imprisonment
for an offence against the Narcotics Act
(Betaeubungsmittelgesetz). The Heilbronn Regional Court
(Landgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal on 12 March 1973.
These proceedings are not here in issue.
10. The criminal proceedings to which the present case relates
began in 1974.
Mr. Pakelli was arrested on 7 May on suspicion of having
committed a further offence against the Narcotics Act; on 4
September, he was granted the assistance of an officially
appointed lawyer, namely Mr. Wingerter, of Heilbronn.
11. The trial opened before the Heilbronn Regional Court on 7
April 1976 and continued on 8, 14, 23 and 3O April. The applicant
was defended by Mr. Wingerter and, at certain moments, by Mr.
Rauschenbusch, a member of the same firm.
On 30 April, the court sentenced Mr. Pakelli to two years' and
three months' imprisonment for an offence against the Narcotics
Act and for tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung): it was found to be
proved that in the spring of 1972 the accused had illegally
imported into Germany sixteen kilograms of cannabis resin of
Turkish origin, hidden in his car.
12. On 3 May 1976, Mr. Wingerter filed an appeal on points of
law (Revision). In his memorial of 5 August, setting out the
grounds of appeal, he relied, inter alia, on Article 146 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that several accused
persons may not be defended by one and the same lawyer (see
paragraph 26 below). Mr. Wingerter explained that he had
previously represented another person who on the occasion in
question had, according to the Regional Court's findings, been Mr.
Pakelli's accomplice.
Mr. Pakelli was released on 10 August 1976 and returned to
Turkey.
On 22 October, the Federal public prosecutor
(Generalbundesanwalt) moved that the appeal be held inadmissible
on the ground that it had been filed by a defence counsel who, on
his own admission, was not entitled to represent the applicant.
On 19 November, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied for leave to proceed
out of time (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand) in order to
lodge a fresh appeal, which appeal he in fact filed at the same
moment. On 21 December 1976, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
allowed the application; it had first sought the opinion of the
public prosecutor who, without giving reasons, had indicated that
he was in favour of such a course.
On 13 January 1977, the Regional Court granted Mr.
Rauschenbusch's request of 19 November 1976 to be appointed
official defence counsel to file the memorial setting out the
grounds of appeal; two weeks later it relieved Mr. Wingerter of
his duties.
13. In his memorial of 26 January 1977, which was thirty-four
pages in length, Mr. Rauschenbusch complained solely of procedural
errors (Verfahrensrugen). He listed nineteen, most of which
concerned decisions of the Heilbronn Regional Court refusing to
appoint an expert or to summon, question or have questions put to
witnesses. The last of the alleged errors related to Article 146
of the Code of Criminal Procedure: recalling that Mr. Wingerter
had previously defended another person whom the Regional Court had
convicted, on 21 June 1974, as an accomplice of Mr. Pakelli, Mr.
Rauschenbusch maintained that this recourse to a common defence
counsel had been contrary to the interests of both accused (see
paragraph 26 below).
14. In its observations in reply ({Gegenerklarung}) of 14 March
1977, the public prosecutor's office attached to the Regional
Court submitted that the appeal was inadmissible. It considered
that Article 146 prevented Mr. Rauschenbusch, just as it did Mr.
Wingerter, from acting in the case as officially appointed lawyer.
Mr. Rauschenbusch replied on 23 March. He pointed out, amongst
other things, that since he had never defended Mr. Pakelli's
accomplice, Article 146 did not apply to him.
On 20 April, the Federal public prosecutor invited the above-
mentioned office to comment on the complaints that had been made;
in his view, it was at least doubtful whether the appeal was
inadmissible de plano.
On 12 August, the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office filed
its supplementary observations (weitere Gegenerklaerung), dated 1
August; it sent a copy to Mr. Rauschenbusch. In accordance with
the practice in such matters (Instruction no. 162 of the
Instructions on Criminal Procedure and Administrative Fines
Procedure - Richtlinien {fur} das Strafverfahren und das
Bussgeldverfahren), the observations reproduced for each complaint
the relevant documents in the case-file, in particular the
requests made by the applicant's lawyer during the trial and the
decisions taken by the Regional Court thereon. As regards Article
146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the public prosecutor's
office referred to its earlier observations, including those of 14
March.
15. On application by the Federal public prosecutor's office,
the Federal Court decided on 13 October 1977 to hold a hearing
(Hauptverhandlung) on 29 November. Mr. Rauschenbusch and his
client, who had returned to Turkey, were notified of this on 17
October.
16. On 24 October, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied to be officially
appointed as the applicant's lawyer for the hearing of 29
November.
The President of the 1st Criminal Chamber (Strafsenat) of the
Federal Court refused the application on the following day. In his
view, an accused (Angeklagter) who was at liberty was not entitled
to such an appointment for hearings in an appeal on a point of
law; there was no legal requirement at that stage for him either
to appear in person or to be represented by a lawyer (Article 350
paras. 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph 22
below). As regards compliance with procedural rules
(verfahrensrechtlich), an appeal court (Revisionsgericht) would
examine the impugned decision on the basis of the written grounds
of appeal; as regards any substantive complaints (bei
sachlichrechtlicher Beanstandung), it would effect of its own
motion a review that was not subject to any limitations.
Furthermore, on this occasion neither the facts of the case nor
the legal issues it raised justified the appointment requested.
In the objections (Gegenvorstellungen) he raised on 7 November
1977, Mr. Rauschenbusch cited a judgment of 19 October 1977 of the
Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 22 below), holding
that, in addition to the cases provided for by law, legal aid had
to be granted for hearings in appeals on a point of law in
"serious" ("schwerwiegend") cases if the person concerned was
unable to pay a lawyer of his own choosing. And, he submitted, Mr.
Pakelli was in such a situation, for a final conviction would lead
to his expulsion. Mr. Rauschenbusch asked the Federal Court to
indicate whether he should supply particulars of the applicant's
assets in order to substantiate (glaubhaft machen) the latter's
lack of means. According to Mr. Rauschenbusch, Mr. Pakelli was
obviously (offensichtlich) not in a position to pay a lawyer. He
had come to the Federal Republic as a migrant worker and had
returned to Turkey after spending a long (laengeren) period in
Heilbronn prison. It was evident that he had no savings.
Mr. Rauschenbusch requested that, if need be, the matter be
referred to the Chamber for decision.
On 10 November, the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber of
the Federal Court confirmed his decision of 25 October refusing
the application; he took the view that the above-mentioned
judgment of 19 October 1977 did not concern a case that was
comparable to the applicant's.
17. The hearing was held on 29 November 1977, in the absence of
the applicant and of Mr. Rauschenbusch. According to the minutes,
the Federal Court heard the judge acting as rapporteur and then
the submissions (Ausfuhrungen) of an official of the Federal
public prosecutor's office (Bundesanwaltschaft) in favour of
rejecting the appeal. After deliberating in private, the court
gave on the same day judgment dismissing the appeal.
The judgment held firstly that the appeal was admissible:
Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent Mr.
Rauschenbusch from representing Mr. Pakelli before the Federal
Court. On the other hand, that Article had not been complied with
at first instance since Mr. Wingerter had previously defended the
applicant's accomplice. However, the Federal Court, referring to a
judgment of its 3rd Criminal Chamber (see paragraph 26 below),
added that an appeal on a point of law based on that Article could
succeed only if the representation of several accused by one and
the same lawyer proved to be really incompatible, in the
circumstances of the case, with the duties of the defence. And on
this occasion it had not been established that there was any
conflict of interests.
The Federal Court then rejected the remainder of the
complaints: some were examined in detail and held to be without
foundation and the others were considered more briefly and held to
be manifestly ill-founded.
The judgment, which was ten pages in length, was served on Mr.
Rauschenbusch on 21 December 1977.
18. In January 1978, Mr. Wingerter lodged an appeal with the
Federal Constitutional Court. Alleging a violation of Articles 1,
2, 3, 6, 20 and 103 para. 1 of the Basic Law, he repeated the
submissions made by his colleague Mr. Rauschenbusch before the
Federal Court on 7 November 1977 (see paragraph 16 above). He
argued that it was only through a defence counsel that Mr. Pakelli
could have availed himself of his right to be heard: he lived in
Turkey, lacked financial resources and had an insufficient command
of German. In addition, the legal issues involved were
particularly complex, as was shown by the length of the memorial
setting out the grounds of appeal (see paragraph 13 above) and the
Federal Court's decision to hold a hearing. Mr. Pakelli should
therefore have been given the opportunity of stating his views on
the submissions of the Federal public prosecutor's office. Again,
the consequences of an unfavourable judgment would have been such
as to make the official appointment of a lawyer essential: for the
applicant, dismissal of the appeal meant his undoing in Germany
and the breakdown of his marriage and family life.
Mr. Wingerter, who requested that legal aid be granted to the
applicant, asked the Constitutional Court to indicate whether he
should supply particulars of his client's assets in order to
substantiate (glaubhaft machen) the latter's lack of means.
In a ruling given on 10 May 1978 by a panel of three judges,
the Constitutional Court decided not to hear the appeal on the
ground that it did not offer sufficient prospects of success. The
Constitutional Court found nothing arbitrary in the decision of
the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Federal Court.
Moreover, the case was not "serious", within the meaning of the
above-mentioned judgment of 19 October 1977 (see paragraphs 16
above and 22 below). Finally, Mr. Pakelli could have remained in
the Federal Republic of Germany and attended the hearing before
the Federal Court, if need be with the assistance of an
interpreter.
19. After his arrest on 7 May 1974, Mr. Pakelli had remained in
custody until 10 August 1976, partly in detention on remand and
partly to serve sentences that had been imposed on him.
II. Relevant legislation
1. Officially appointed lawyers
20. If the accused has not chosen a defence counsel, the trial
court will appoint one in the following cases (listed in Article
140 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure):
- the trial at first instance is before the Court of Appeal
(Oberlandesgericht) or the Regional Court;
- the accused is charged with an indictable offence
(Verbrechen);
- the proceedings may result in the accused's being prohibited
from exercising a profession;
- the accused is deaf or dumb;
- the accused has been interned for at least three months by
order or with the approval of a court and has not been released at
least two weeks before the opening of the trial;
- the question arises whether the accused should be detained
for mental examination;
- the case concerns preventive detention proceedings
(Sicherungsverfahren);
- a decision has been taken prohibiting the previous defence
counsel from taking part in the proceedings.
An appointment will also be made in other cases, either by the
court of its own motion or at the accused's request, if such a
step appears necessary on account of the seriousness of the act in
question, the factual or legal complexity of the case, or if it is
obvious that the accused cannot conduct his own defence (Article
140 para. 2).
21. The official appointment of a lawyer by the trial court
covers not only the proceedings before that court but also the
written stage of any appeal on a point of law. If necessary, the
trial court will make a special appointment for the latter stage.
22. An accused (Angeklagter) who is in custody does not have an
enforceable right to attend hearings in an appeal on a point of
law - whether before the appeal court or the Federal Court
(Articles 121 and 135 of the Judicial Code -
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) -, but he may be represented thereat by
a lawyer (Article 350 para. 2). If he has not chosen a lawyer and
is not brought to the hearing, the President of the court having
jurisdiction will appoint one for him if he so requests (Article
350 para. 3).
An accused who is at liberty may appear in person or be
represented by a lawyer at the appeal hearing (Article 350 para.
2). According to the case-law of the Federal Court, defence
counsel can be assigned to him only under Article 140 para. 2 (see
paragraph 20 above), since Article 140 para. 1 does not apply to
hearings in an appeal on a point of law (Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 19, pp. 258 - 263).
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that
defence counsel is to be appointed by the court of its own motion
and at the expense of the State in serious cases (schwerwiegende
{Falle}) if the accused cannot pay for a lawyer of his own
choosing (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, vol. 46,
pp. 202 - 213).
2. Hearings in appeals on points of law
23. The court concerned may dispose of an appeal on a point of
law without hearings in the following cases only:
- where it finds the appeal inadmissible (Article 349 para. 1
of the Code of Criminal Procedure);
- where, on a reasoned application by the public prosecutor's
office, the court considers unanimously that the appeal is
manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 para. 2); and
- where the court finds unanimously that an appeal filed in the
interests of the accused is well-founded (Article 349 para. 4).
In all other cases the court has to hold a hearing before
taking its decision (Article 349 para. 5); before the Federal
Court, there are hearings in only ten per cent of the appeals on
points of law lodged in criminal cases.
When the public prosecutor's office applies for an appeal to be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded, it has to communicate its
submissions and the reasons to the appellant; the latter may file
a reply within two weeks (Article 349 para. 3).
24. Article 350 para. 1 requires that the accused and his
lawyer be informed of the date and place of the hearing; if it is
not possible to contact the former, notification to the latter is
sufficient.
25. Appeal hearings open with the rapporteur's address; this is
followed by the statements and submissions of the public
prosecutor's office, the accused and his defence counsel. The
appellant is heard first and the last address to the court is
always made by the accused (Article 351).
3. "Common defence counsel"
(gemeinschaftliche Verteidigung)
26. According to the former version of Article 146 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, which was in force until 31 December 1974,
several accused could be represented by a single counsel if this
was not contrary to the interests of the defence. As it was often
difficult for courts to detect or establish such conflicts of
interests, Article 146 was modified in 1974: the new text, which
has been applicable since 1 January 1975, does not allow several
accused to be defended by a common defence counsel.
However, the Federal Court (3rd Criminal Chamber) held on 27
February and 13 October 1976 that an appeal on a point of law
based on a violation of Article 146 could succeed only if recourse
to a common defence counsel was in fact contrary to the interests
of the defence (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Strafsachen, vol. 26, pp. 291 - 298; vol. 27, pp. 22 - 24). The
1st Criminal Chamber followed these precedents in its judgment of
29 November 1977 in the present case (see paragraph 17 above). The
Government stated that this interpretation has since been accepted
by all the Criminal Chambers of the Federal Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
27. In his application lodged with the Commission on 5 October
1978 (no. 8398/78), Mr. Pakelli claimed to be the victim of a
violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the
Convention. He alleged that he had lacked the means to pay for
defence counsel of his own choosing and that the interests of
justice required that a lawyer should have been appointed to
represent him at the hearing before the Federal Court. He also
asserted that he had not been able to return to the Federal
Republic of Germany to present his own case, since he had neither
a residence permit nor the necessary money to pay an interpreter.
On 16 May 1980, the Commission granted Mr. Pakelli free legal
aid on the basis of a declaration of means dated 9 September 1979
and confirmed by certificates from the competent authorities.
On 7 May 1981, the Commission declared the application
admissible in so far as it related to the rejection of the
applicant's request that a lawyer be officially appointed for the
hearing before the Federal Court; it declared the other complaints
inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
(Articles 26 and 27 para. 3 (art. 26, art. 27-3) of the
Convention).
In its report of 12 December 1981 (Article 31), the Commission
expressed the unanimous opinion that the applicant had been the
victim of a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) and,
by eleven votes to one, that it was not required to determine
whether there had also been breach of the right to a fair trial,
within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
28. At the close of the hearings of 25 November 1982, the
Government invited the Court "to hold that there has not been a
violation of Article 6 paras. 3 (c) and 1 (art. 6-3-c, art. 6-1)
of the Convention in the applicant's case".
AS TO THE LAW
29. The applicant complained of the refusal of the Federal
Court, in proceedings concerning an appeal on points of law
(Revision), to appoint Mr. Rauschenbusch as official defence
counsel for the hearings of 29 November 1977 before that court; he
alleged that this constituted a violation of paragraph 3 (c) (art.
6-3-c), and also of paragraph 1, of Article 6 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
It was not disputed that these provisions were applicable in
the present case and the Court takes this point as established
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970,
Series A no. 11, pp. 13 - 15, paras. 25 and 26, and the Artico
judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15 - 18, paras. 31 -
38). However, as the Government rightly pointed out, the manner in
which those paragraphs are to be applied depends on the special
features of the proceedings involved (see the above-mentioned
Delcourt judgment, ibid.).
I. The alleged violation
of article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)
30. Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) reads as follows:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require;
..."
Before the Commission, the Government argued that Article 6
para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) did not require the grant of free legal
assistance in the present case since Mr. Pakelli could have
appeared in person at the Federal Court's hearing. Although they
did not dwell on this point before the Court, they repeated that
the applicant could have presented his own case to the Federal
Court.
31. Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) guarantees three rights
to a person charged with a criminal offence: to defend himself in
person, to defend himself through legal assistance of his own
choosing and, on certain conditions, to be given legal assistance
free. To link the corresponding phrases together, the English text
employs on each occasion the disjunctive "or"; the French text, on
the other hand, utilises the equivalent - "ou" - only between the
phrases enouncing the first and the second right; thereafter, it
uses the conjunctive "et". The "travaux {preparatoires}" contain
hardly any explanation of this linguistic difference. They reveal
solely that in the course of a final examination of the draft
Convention, on the eve of its signature, a Committee of Experts
made "a certain number of formal corrections and corrections of
translation", including the replacement of "and" by "or" in the
English version of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) (Collected
Edition of the "Travaux {preparatoires}", vol. IV, p. 1010).
Having regard to the object and purpose of this paragraph, which
is designed to ensure effective protection of the rights of the
defence (see the above-mentioned Artico judgment, Series A no. 37,
p. 16, para. 33; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Adolf judgment of
26 March 1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, para. 30, and the Sunday
Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, para.
48), the French text here provides more reliable guidance; the
Court concurs with the Commission on this point. Accordingly, a
"person charged with a criminal offence" who does not wish to
defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal
assistance of his own choosing; if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for such assistance, he is entitled under the
Convention to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require.
Thus Mr. Pakelli, although authorised by German law to appear
in person before the Federal Court, could claim such assistance to
the extent that the conditions laid down by Article 6 para. 3 (c)
(art. 6-3-c) were satisfied.
A. Absence of sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance
32. The Government argued as follows. There was nothing to
substantiate the applicant's assertion that he did not have
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance of his own choosing;
on the contrary, he had himself stated before the Regional Court
that he earned a very good income in the Federal Republic of
Germany; according to the findings contained in the judgment of 30
April 1976 (see paragraph 11 above), he also made money from his
drug traffic activities; in addition, he had opened a business
shortly after returning to Turkey.
The Commission considered that the Government were not entitled
at this stage to challenge the applicant's assertions. It pointed
out firstly that under German law the grant of free legal
assistance was not conditional on the indigence of the litigant in
question; secondly, Mr. Rauschenbusch had offered before the
hearings to supply a certificate of indigence (see paragraph 16
above), but the Federal Court did not accept this offer.
33. The Court is unable to agree with the Commission on this
point. The question of Mr. Pakelli's means played no part in the
decision complained of: the refusal of the request for the
appointment of Mr. Rauschenbusch was based solely on the fact
that, in the opinion of the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber
of the Federal Court, the case did not fall within the category of
cases for which German law prescribed the assistance of a defence
counsel (see paragraph 16 above). Accordingly, the Government
cannot be held to have lost their entitlement to contest before
the Convention institutions, in the context of Article 6 para. 3
(c) (art. 6-3-c), the applicant's claim that he was indigent.
34. It has nevertheless to be recognised, as was done by the
Commission's Delegate, that it is in practice impossible to prove
today that in 1977 Mr. Pakelli did not have the means to pay his
lawyer. However, there are some indications that this was so.
Thus, there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Rauschenbusch would
have been unable to obtain the above-mentioned certificate; in
this connection, it has to be noted that his client had spent two
years in custody in the Federal Republic of Germany before
returning to Turkey in 1976 (see paragraphs 15 and 19 above). In
addition, Mr. Pakelli supplied to the Commission in 1979 a
statement of means and certificates from the competent Turkish
authorities, the latter being based on the declaration of assets
and income which he had made for tax purposes the previous year;
it appeared from these documents that he was engaged in business
on a small scale and that his financial situation was modest.
These data - which, moreover, were not disputed by the Government
- led the Commission to grant him free legal aid (see paragraph 27
above).
Admittedly, these particulars are not sufficient to prove
beyond all doubt that the applicant was indigent at the relevant
time; however, having regard to his offer to the Federal Court to
prove his lack of means and in the absence of clear indications to
the contrary, they lead the Court to regard the first of the two
conditions contained in Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) as
satisfied.
B. The interests of justice
35. According to the applicant and the Commission, the
interests of justice required that Mr. Rauschenbusch be officially
appointed as the applicant's lawyer for the hearings of 29
November 1977 before the Federal Court.
In contesting this view, the Government made the following
points. Mr. Pakelli had had a defence counsel during the written
stage of the proceedings; as for the hearings, their object was
circumscribed by the grounds of his appeal on points of law: since
he was challenging the judgment of 30 April 1976 solely on account
of alleged procedural errors, he could neither raise new
complaints nor supplement his memorial setting out the grounds of
appeal by referring to other questions of fact. Only legal
arguments and submissions could have been put to the court at the
hearings. The issues involved were not complicated and it could
not be said that their determination would entail serious
consequences, for the proceedings could not have led to any
aggravation of the decision complained of. Moreover, Mr. Pakelli
could have appeared in person. Finally, the Commission had
misunderstood the role of the Federal public prosecutor's office
in appeals on a point of law. That role consisted of examining the
grounds of appeal from a completely independent standpoint and, in
particular, of ensuring that the law was uniformly applied and
that case-law remained consistent; it was thus very similar to the
role of the Procureur {general} attached to the Belgian Court of
Cassation (see the above-mentioned Delcourt judgment).
36. The Court notes firstly, as did the Commission, that this
was one of the rare cases in which the Federal Court held a
hearing: this occurs in only ten per cent of the appeals on a
point of law in criminal cases (see paragraph 23 above). In fact,
on the present occasion the Federal Court was obliged to arrange
for oral proceedings since the appeal proved to be admissible and
the public prosecutor's office had not applied for it to be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure; see paragraph 23 above). This shows that the
hearing could have been of importance for the decision to be
given. It therefore became necessary, in order to ensure a fair
trial, to comply with the rule that oral proceedings shall take
place with the participation of both parties ({debat}
contradictoire).
37. It is true that, since the applicant confined himself to
alleging that there had been procedural errors (Articles 344 para.
2 and 352 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Federal
Court had solely to give a ruling on the grounds which he had
invoked and later set out at length in his memorial (see paragraph
13 above). However, Mr. Pakelli would have been able, had his
lawyer appeared before the court, to explain his complaints, to
supply further particulars thereof if need be and to develop his
written arguments. He would, for example, have been able to
comment on the statement made by the judge acting as rapporteur
(Article 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph 25
above). Such possibilities of intervening in the course of the
proceedings would have been all the more valuable because the
appeal, itself a voluminous document, concerned nineteen different
points.
Again, as the Commission rightly pointed out, one of the
complaints made related to the application of the new version of
Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, the 3rd
Criminal Chamber of the Federal Court had already decided, in
1976, that an appeal on a point of law based on this Article could
succeed only if recourse to a common defence counsel had in fact
been contrary to the interests of the defence (see paragraph 26
above). Moreover, Mr. Rauschenbusch did not contest this
interpretation. However, he endeavoured to demonstrate that there
had been a conflict of interests in the present case. In addition,
it could be predicted that the judgment that the Federal Court was
going to deliver would not be without importance for the
development of case-law. The Government themselves stated that the
case-law on this point has remained constant since the judgment of
29 November 1977 dismissing the applicant's appeal; they
recognised that oral argument on the interpretation of Article 146
would have been of some value.
38. In these circumstances, it goes without saying that the
personal appearance of the appellant would not have compensated
for the absence of his lawyer: without the services of a legal
practitioner, Mr. Pakelli could not have made a useful
contribution to the examination of the legal issues arising, and
in particular the issue relating to Article 146 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The Court concurs with the Commission on this
point.
39. Finally and above all, the appeal proceedings in the
present case were not conducted with the participation of both
parties, in any event at the stage of the hearings. Even during
the written phase, only the public prosecutor's office attached to
the Heilbronn Regional Court replied to the appeal lodged by Mr.
Pakelli, who was then still represented by Mr. Rauschenbusch, and
it made no submissions on the merits of the grounds invoked (see
paragraph 14 above). As regards the Federal public prosecutor's
office - and irrespective of its precise role in appeal
proceedings -, German law enabled the appellant to contest its
submissions (Article 349 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure; see paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, if the Federal
Court had not decided to hold a hearing, the Federal public
prosecutor's office would have filed its submissions in writing
and communicated them to the applicant and the latter, as he
rightly pointed out, would thus have had an opportunity of
studying them and, if need be, of replying thereto.
This opportunity of refuting the public prosecutor's office's
arguments should therefore have been made available to Mr. Pakelli
at the hearings also. By refusing to provide him with a defence
counsel, the Federal Court deprived him, during the oral stage of
the proceedings, of the opportunity of influencing the outcome of
the case, a possibility that he would have retained had the
proceedings been conducted entirely in writing.
40. In these circumstances, the Court, like the Commission,
considers that the interests of justice did require that the
applicant be granted legal assistance for the hearings before the
Federal Court.
C. Conclusion
41. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 para.
3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.
II. The alleged violation
of article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
42. The applicant also invoked, as regards the same facts,
paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1), which reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from
all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests
of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice."
The Government did not put forward any separate arguments on
this issue.
In company with the Commission, the Court would recall that the
provisions of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) represent
specific applications of the general principle of a fair trial,
stated in paragraph 1 (see the Deweer judgment of 27 February
1980, Series A no. 35, p. 30, para. 56). Accordingly, the question
whether paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) was observed has no real
significance in the applicant's case; it is absorbed by the
question whether paragraph 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) was complied with.
The finding of a breach of the requirements of paragraph 3 (c)
(art. 6-3-c) dispenses the Court from also examining the case in
the light of paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Deweer judgment, Series A no. 35, pp. 30 - 31,
para. 56).
III. The application of article 50 (art. 50)
43. Mr. Pakelli sought just satisfaction under Article 50 (art.
50). In the first place, he requested the Court to annul the
Federal Court's judgment of 29 November 1977 and to direct the
Government to issue an official disapproval of certain passages
therein, which he regarded as racist or discriminatory and
therefore unacceptable. In the second place, he asked for
compensation of such amount as the Court considered fit for his
alleged non-pecuniary loss. Finally, he claimed reimbursement of
the costs and expenses entailed by the proceedings before the
Federal Constitutional Court, which he quantified at DM 668.96.
44. The Government submitted that these various claims should
be rejected. They maintained that the applicant had not been
prejudiced in any way by the Federal Court's refusal to appoint a
lawyer for him officially and that his criticisms of the reasons
for that court's decision were unwarranted. As regards the costs
and expenses of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court,
the Government contended that it was not established that Mr.
Pakelli had had to bear them; they also stated that the amount
claimed did not exactly correspond to the scale applicable at the
relevant time.
45. The Court considers that in the circumstances the question
is ready for decision (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence, of the
Rules of Court).
The Court notes, as regards the first claim, that it is not
empowered under the Convention either to annul the Federal Court's
judgment or to direct the Government to disavow the passages
complained of (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment of 13
June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 25, para. 58, and the Dudgeon
judgment of 24 February 1983, Series A no. 59, p. 8, para. 15).
Without expressing any opinion on those passages, it adds that
they cannot be regarded as the consequence of the breach of
Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c).
46. As the Government rightly pointed out, Mr. Wingerter has
neither established the existence of the alleged non-pecuniary
loss nor even indicated the nature thereof. There is nothing to
show that the absence of a defence counsel left Mr. Pakelli with a
distressing sensation of isolation, confusion and neglect (see the
above-mentioned Artico judgment, Series A no. 37, p. 21, para.
47); in fact, this seems unlikely since he had returned to Turkey
as early as the month of August 1976. In any event, the finding of
a violation, contained in the present judgment, has already
furnished sufficient redress for the alleged non-pecuniary loss
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere
judgment of 18 October 1982, Series A no. 54, p. 8, para. 16).
47. The costs and expenses whose reimbursement was claimed were
incurred in order to try to have the breach of the requirements of
Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) rectified by the Federal
Constitutional Court (see the above-mentioned Dudgeon judgment,
Series A no. 59, p. 9, para. 20). Moreover, this was not contested
by the Government. However, they claimed that these items had been
disbursed by the applicant's counsel and not by the applicant
himself, since Mr. Wingerter had waived repayment and was
moreover, on account of statutory limitation, no longer entitled
to recover the debt due to him.
In fact, Mr. Pakelli has not so far paid his lawyer for
representing him before the Federal Constitutional Court: Mr.
Wingerter did not send him a note of his fees until 7 February
1982 and he stated that it would be in order to defer payment,
having regard to the applicant's financial difficulties. In a
memorial of 16 June 1980 filed with the Commission, Mr. Wingerter
had pointed out that he had not yet received any fees for the
proceedings in question and that he had not asked for any ("ein
Honorar gar nicht erst gefordert") since he knew his client to be
without means.
Nevertheless, neither these statements nor the other documents
before the Court show sufficiently clearly that there has been any
waiver. Indeed, as the Commission's Delegate rightly pointed out,
it is not surprising that Mr. Wingerter, knowing his client's
financial circumstances, decided not to send him a note of his
fees at an earlier date (see the X v. the United Kingdom judgment
of 18 October 1982, Series A no. 55, p. 18, para. 24). The Court
would here point out, as did the Delegate, that in a human rights
case a lawyer will be acting in the general interest if he agrees
to represent or assist a litigant even if the latter is not in a
position to pay him immediately.
As regards the argument based on the statutory limitation of
Mr. Wingerter's right to recover the debt due to him, this is not
a matter of public policy and could be relied on only by Mr.
Pakelli himself.
Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court finds that the sum of
DM 668.96 claimed for fees and expenses is reasonable.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of paragraph 3 (c) of
Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6-3-c);
2. Holds that it is not necessary also to examine the case
under paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1);
3. Holds that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
in respect of legal costs and expenses, the sum of six hundred and
sixty-eight German marks and ninety-six pfennigs (DM 668.96) and
rejects the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, the French text being authentic,
at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-fifth day of
April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three.
Signed: {Gerard WIARDA}
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre EISSEN}
Registrar
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