[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ ТУРЦИИ
(Страсбург, 25 мая 1998 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Социалистическая партия (СП), первый заявитель, была основана 1
февраля 1988 г. и распущена в октябре 1992 г. Решением
Конституционного Суда. Г-н Илхан Кирит и г-н Догу Перинчек, второй
и третий заявители, были соответственно председателем и бывшим
председателем партии. Они проживают в Стамбуле.
15 февраля 1988 г., через две недели после основания партии
Генеральный прокурор обратился в Конституционный Суд с требованием
о ее роспуске, утверждая со ссылками на программу партии, что она
стремится установить в стране диктатуру пролетариата.
8 декабря того же года Конституционный Суд отклонил запрос как
необоснованный: по его мнению, политические цели партии,
сформулированные в программе, не противоречили Конституции.
14 ноября 1991 г. Генеральный прокурор вторично обратился в
Конституционный Суд. Ссылаясь на публикации СП и заявления ее
руководителей, в том числе во время избирательной кампании по
выборам в Парламент, он утверждал, что деятельность партии
направлена на подрыв территориальной целостности государства и
единства нации, что является нарушением пяти статей Конституции и
трех статей Закона N 2820 (О политических партиях).
В своем Решении от 10 июля 1992 г., опубликованном 25 октября
1992 г., Конституционный Суд объявил о роспуске СП. Это повлекло
за собой ipso jure конфискацию и передачу имущества СП в
Казначейство и запрещение ее руководителям занимать любой подобный
пост в будущем.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе заявителя в Комиссию, поданной 31 декабря 1992 г.,
утверждалось, что были нарушены несколько статей Конвенции - 6, 9,
10, 11, взятые отдельно и в сочетании со статьей 14, а также
статьи 1 и 3 Протокола N 1. Жалоба была признана частично
приемлемой.
В своем докладе от 26 ноября 1996 г. Комиссия установила факты
и единогласно пришла к выводу, что:
a) имело место нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции,
b) не было нарушения статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции;
c) нет отдельного вопроса по статьям 9 и 10 Конвенции;
d) нет необходимости рассматривать отдельно, имело ли место
нарушение статей 14 и 18 Конвенции и статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1.
Комиссия передала дело в Суд 27 января 1997.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 11 Конвенции
24. Заявители утверждали, что роспуск Социалистической партии
(СП) и запрет ее руководителям занимать подобные посты в любой
другой политической партии нарушили их право на свободу
ассоциаций, гарантируемое статьей 11 Конвенции, которая
предусматривает:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу мирных собраний и на
свободу ассоциации с другими, включая право создавать
профессиональные союзы и вступать в таковые для защиты своих
интересов.
2. Осуществление этих прав не подлежит никаким ограничениям,
кроме тех, которые установлены законом и которые необходимы в
демократическом обществе в интересах государственной безопасности
и общественного спокойствия, в целях предотвращения беспорядков и
преступлений, охраны здоровья и нравственности или защиты прав и
свобод других лиц. Настоящая статья не препятствует введению
законных ограничений на осуществление этих прав лицами, входящими
в состав вооруженных сил, полиции или административных органов
государства".
A. Применимость статьи 11
1. Аргументы сторон
a) Заявители
Заявители утверждали что политические партии, несомненно,
подпадают под действие статьи 11.
b) Правительство
26. В своем Меморандуме Правительство утверждало, что статья 11
ни в коем случае не применима к политическим партиям. Если в своем
уставе и программе партия подвергает нападкам конституционный
строй государства, Суд должен объявить, что Конвенция не применима
ratione materiae, или применить статью 17.
27. Деятельность СП явно свидетельствует о том, что ее цели
несовместимы с фундаментальными конституционными принципами
Турции. Из ее заявления очевидно, что партия признает за
гражданами курдского происхождения статус "нации" и "народа" и
право на "образование отдельного государства", что она выступала
за учреждение федерации, не исключая даже создания федеральных
образований, имеющих право открывать консульства в других странах.
Поскольку это было равнозначно тому, чтобы ставить под сомнение
саму основу государства, Конституционный Суд должен был
рассмотреть конституционность такой политической цели. Выполняя
эту задачу, он следовал линии, намеченной Решениями
Конституционного Суда Германии от 31 октября 1991 г. о праве лиц с
иностранным гражданством принимать участие в голосовании на
выборах в местные органы и Конституционного Совета Франции от 9
мая 1991 г. о статусе Корсики.
Во время разбирательства Правительство утверждало, что
государства - участники Конвенции не имели никогда намерения
поставить под контроль органов Совета Европы свои конституционные
институты, и в особенности принципы, которые они рассматривали как
необходимые условия их существования. По этой причине политическая
партия типа СП, поставившая эти институты или принципы под
сомнение, не может требовать применения Конвенции или ее
Протоколов, поскольку предмет спора в настоящем деле не свобода
ассоциаций, но право на самоопределение, которое не входит в сферу
действия Конвенции.
В крайнем случае в отношении СП следует применить статью 17
Конвенции, поскольку партия стремилась оправдать использование
насилия и возбудить ненависть к турецкому государству, а также к
неправомерному разделению всего народа на два противостоящих
лагеря. Выполняя эту задачу, СП говорила тем же языком, что и
Рабочая партия Курдистана (РПК); СП не отмежевалась ни от одного
из методов последней. Конституционный Суд в своем Решении о
роспуске СП отметил, что деятельность партии подпадает под
действие статьи 17 Конвенции.
c) Комиссия
28. Комиссия выразила мнение, что в тексте статьи 11 не
содержится ничего, что ограничивало бы сферу ее действия особой
формой ассоциации или группы или предполагало бы, что она не
распространяется на политические партии. Напротив, если
рассматривать статью 11 как юридическую гарантию, которая
обеспечивает надлежащее функционирование демократии, то
политические партии представляют одну из наиболее важных форм
ассоциации, защиту которых она предусматривает. В этой связи
Комиссия упомянула целый ряд решений, в которых она рассмотрела в
соответствии со статьей 11 различные ограничения деятельности
политических партий и даже роспуск таких партий, тем самым
подтверждая, что статья 11 применяется к этому типу ассоциаций
(см. дело Коммунистической партии Германии, жалоба N 250/57,
Annuaire, т. 1 с. 225; Греческое дело, Annuaire, т. 12, с. 170, п.
392; дело Франция, Норвегия, Дания, Швеция и Нидерланды против
Турции, жалоба N 9940-9944/82. D.R. 35, с. 143).
Во время разбирательства в Суде представитель Комиссии также
заявил, что не было необходимости применять статью 17 Конвенции,
поскольку ни программа СП, ни заявления, сделанные г-ном
Перинчеком и ставшие предметом судебного разбирательства, не
указывали на то, что речь шла о ликвидации прав и свобод,
защищаемых Конвенцией.
2. Оценка Суда
29. В своем Решении по делу Объединенная коммунистическая
партия Турции и другие против Турции от 30 января 1998 г. Суд
указал, что политические партии представляют собой форму
ассоциации, жизненно необходимую для надлежащего функционирования
демократии, и что ввиду важности демократии в системе Конвенции не
может быть сомнения, что политические партии подпадают под
действие статьи 11. С другой стороны, Суд отметил, что ассоциация,
в том числе политическая партия, не может быть лишена защиты,
предоставляемой Конвенцией, лишь потому, что ее действия
расцениваются национальными органами власти как подрыв
конституционных основ государства и требуют применения
запретительных мер. Суд не видит никакого основания в настоящем
деле, чтобы прийти к другому заключению.
Что касается применения статьи 17, Суд обратится к этому
вопросу позже (см. п. 53 ниже).
B. Соблюдение статьи 11
1. Наличие вмешательства
30. Все заявители подтвердили, что роспуск СП являлся
вмешательством в их право на свободу ассоциаций. Такое же мнение
сложилось и у Суда.
2. Было ли вмешательство оправданным
31. Вмешательство является нарушением статьи 11, если оно не
"предусмотрено законом", не преследует одну или более правомерных
целей согласно п. 2 и "необходимо в демократическом обществе" для
достижения этих целей.
a) "Предусмотрено законом"
32. Все сошлись во мнении, что ограничение было "предусмотрено
законом", поскольку оспариваемые Решения Конституционного Суда
основывались на статье 2, статье 3 п. 1, статье 6, статье 10 и
статье 14 п. 1 и бывшей статье 68 Конституции, а также статьях 78,
81 и 96 (3) Закона N 2820 о политических партиях.
b) Правомерная цель
33. Правительство утверждало, что ограничение преследовало
целый ряд правомерных целей: обеспечение государственной
безопасности, общественного спокойствия и территориальной
целостности и защиты прав и свобод других лиц. Если Суд признал в
Судебном решении по делу Хаджианастассиу против Греции от 16
декабря 1992 г. (Серия A, т. 252), что государственной
безопасности может нанести вред даже отдельный случай шпионажа, то
тем более обоснован такой вывод применительно к настоящему делу,
где угрозе подвергается само существование государства - участника
Конвенции.
34. Заявители отметили, что прокуратура ни на какой стадии
процедуры в Конституционном Суде не ссылалась ни на
государственную безопасность, ни на общественное спокойствие.
Комиссия полагала, что запрещение деятельности, которая, по
мнению властей, могла бы привести к краху государства или к
разделу его территории, можно считать направленным на защиту
"национальной безопасности" и территориальной целостности.
36. Суд считает, что роспуск СП преследовал по крайней мере
одну из "правомерных целей", изложенных в статье 11, - "защита
национальной безопасности".
c) "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
i) Аргументы сторон
1) Заявители
37. Заявители утверждали, что в плюралистической
демократической парламентской системе люди должны иметь право
выражать свое мнение относительно курдской проблемы и путей ее
решения. СП была политической партией, которая пользовалась
поддержкой части общественного мнения, и должна была иметь право
претендовать на власть.
У СП не было никакого сходства с Коммунистической партией
Германии, которая была в свое время запрещена Федеральным
Конституционным Судом Германии (обращение N 250/57, Annuaire, т.
1, с. 225). Иначе Конституционный Суд Турции не отклонил бы 8
декабря 1988 г. первое обращение о роспуске СП (см. п. 10 выше). В
том Решении Конституционный Суд констатировал, что устав и
программа партии находятся в соответствии с Конституцией и что она
является частью демократической системы страны и отрицает
терроризм.
СП никогда не предпринимала незаконных действий, и лучшее тому
доказательство то, что бывший в то время ее председателем г-н
Перинчек стал теперь председателем другой политической партии -
Рабочей партии, которая ведет свою работу вполне законными
методами.
СП всегда считала, что Турция должна быть единым государством.
Федеральная система, которую она предлагала в качестве решения
курдской проблемы, не нарушила бы государственного единства.
Германия и Швейцария являются федеративными государствами, и никто
не усматривал в этом статусе программу разделения страны. Что
касается Турции, федеративное устройство обеспечило бы ее гораздо
более стабильное развитие.
2) Правительство
38. Правительство утверждало, что любое сходство между
настоящим делом и делом Объединенной коммунистической партии
Турции (ОКПТ) было бы лишь внешним; единственное реальное сходство
заключалось в том, что обе партии были распущены по Решению
Конституционного Суда. В случае ОКПТ задача Конституционного Суда
состояла в том, чтобы определить, соблюдают ли программа и устав
партии Конституцию и Закон о политических партиях. В деле СП, с
другой стороны, как ясно объяснил в своем Решении Конституционный
Суд, он должен был определить, соответствовала ли деятельность СП
ее учредительным документам.
После первого рассмотрения вопроса о конституционности партии
(см. п. 9 - 10 выше) появились новые факты и доказательства о
деятельности СП, которые Комиссия в отличие от Конституционного
Суда не приняла во внимание. Они свидетельствуют, что с 1990 г., и
в особенности в 1991 г., СП в своей деятельности полностью отошла
от своего первоначального подхода, отраженного в ее учредительных
документах, и занялась подрывом фундаментальных концепций,
которыми руководствовалась Республика Турция с момента ее
образования.
Такой отход был особенно заметен в речах, позже опубликованных
в партийных изданиях, произнесенных председателем СП г-ном
Перинчеком на собраниях, съездах и политических митингах. Он
использовал сильный, энергичный и провокационный язык, очернял все
другие политические партии и пытался отстаивать использование
насилия и террористических методов, призывая к восстанию,
используя inter alia выражение "Ayaga kalk", которое означает
"поднимайтесь". Конституционный Суд исходя из этого пришел к
выводу, что речи и методы СП были совершенно несовместимы с ее
призывами к братству и равенству.
39. Ссылаясь на анализ ситуации в Турции, сделанный Судом в его
Решении по делу Зана против Турции от 25 ноября 1997 г. (Reports,
1997-VII), Правительство заявило, что в 1990 и 1991 гг. произошло
вопиющее увеличение террористической деятельности, которая
повлекла гибель тысяч людей и не щадила ни женщин, ни детей. В
такой обстановке заявления известного политического лидера не
могли не усугубить насилие и ненависть. К этой ситуации
неприменимы судебные прецеденты, устанавливающие, что свобода
выражения мнения распространяется и на заявления, которые
оскорбляют, шокируют или вызывают раздражение. В настоящем деле
речь идет не о политических дебатах по политическим и
экономическим проблемам, представляющим интерес для страны в
целом, а о подстрекательстве к участию в кровопролитном и жестоком
конфликте между двумя частями населения, которое пользовалось без
какой-либо дискриминации всеми правами и привилегиями,
сформулированными в Конституции и Законе.
В этой связи Правительство ссылалось, как и в деле ОКПТ, на
практику Комиссии, согласно которой, если вмешательство в право
преследует правомерную цель защиты публичного порядка,
территориальной целостности, общественного интереса или
демократии, Конвенция не требует, чтобы риск насилия,
оправдывающий вмешательство, был реальным, актуальным или
неизбежным.
Оспаривая необходимость вмешательства, что является предметом
рассмотрения в настоящем деле, неуместно ссылаться на
оправдательные приговоры в отношении г-на Перинчека, вынесенные
судами государственной безопасности. Это два разных вида судебного
разбирательства, каждое из которых преследует отличные цели:
первый - уголовное судопроизводство, когда Суд выносит решение о
личной ответственности лиц, второй - конституционное
судопроизводство, похожее на то, что имеет место в Европейском
суде, когда единственной рассматриваемой проблемой является
совместимость политической партии с Конституцией, что требует
применения других критериев.
3) Комиссия
40. Комиссия полагала, что роспуск СП не был необходимостью в
условиях демократического общества. Она отметила, что г-н Перинчек
ранее подвергался преследованию в судах по уголовным делам по тем
же обвинениям, которые фигурируют в настоящем деле, но был
оправдан. Комиссия пришла к выводу, что даже в глазах турецких
судебных властей данные публикации не содержали ничего, что имело
целью побудить экстремистские или террористические группы
разрушить конституционный строй государства или образовать с
применением силы курдское государство.
Комиссия также отметила, что СП стремилась достигнуть своих
политических целей, используя исключительно законные средства; не
было доказано какое-либо намерение СП посягать на демократию и
плюрализм в Турции или на основные права человека, пропагандируя
расовую дискриминацию.
ii) Оценка Суда
41. Суд напомнил, что, несмотря на ее автономную роль и особую
сферу применения, статья 11 должна также рассматриваться в свете
статьи 10. Защита мнений и свободы выражать их - одна из целей
свободы собрания и создания ассоциации, как сказано в статье 11.
Это в еще большей степени относится к политическим партиям ввиду
их существенной роли в обеспечении плюрализма и успешного
функционирования демократии.
Суд много раз подчеркивал, не может быть никакой демократии без
плюрализма. Именно по этой причине свобода выражения своего мнения
(статья 10) с оговорками п. 2 охватывает не только "информацию"
или "идею", которые воспринимаются благожелательно или
расцениваются как неоскорбительные или маловажные, но также и те,
которые оскорбляют, шокируют или вызывают раздражение. Поскольку
деятельность политических партий является коллективной реализацией
свободы выражения мнений, уже сам этот факт дает им право искать
защиту статей 10 и 11 Конвенции (см. среди других упомянутое выше
Судебное решение по делу Объединенной коммунистической партии
Турции, п. 42 - 43).
42. Что касается настоящего дела, необходимо в первую очередь
отметить - что в своем Решении от 10 июля 1992 г. Конституционный
Суд исходил из того, что он уже не должен рассматривать,
соответствовали ли программа и устав СП требованиям закона, а лишь
не нарушала ли ее политическая деятельность установленные законом
запреты. Принимая решение о роспуске партии, Конституционный Суд
основывался на публичных заявлениях г-на Перинчека - некоторые из
них в письменной форме, - которые Суд рассматривал как новые факты
и свидетельства о деятельности СП (см. п. 15 выше). Отсюда
вытекает, что Суд может ограничиться изучением этих заявлений.
43. Конституционный Суд отметил, что, делая различие между
двумя нациями - курдами и турками, г-н Перинчек утверждал, что
наличие национальных меньшинств в Турции в конечном счете должно
привести к созданию курдо-турецкой федерации в ущерб единству
турецкой нации и территориальной целостности государства. В
области идеологии СП была противницей национализма Ататюрка,
важнейшего принципа, на котором зиждется Республика Турция.
Несмотря на использование других методов, цель политической
деятельности СП была аналогична цели террористических организаций.
Поскольку СП боролась за сепаратизм и восстание, ее роспуск был
оправдан (см. п. 15 выше).
44. С учетом этих факторов Суд должен был в первую очередь
рассмотреть суть заявлений по спорному вопросу и затем определить,
оправдан ли роспуск СП.
В отношении первой проблемы Суд напомнил, что при этом его
задача состоит не в том, чтобы подменять собой юрисдикцию
национальных органов власти, а в том, чтобы рассмотреть в свете
статьи 11 те решения, которые они вынесли, осуществляя свои
полномочия. Выполняя эту задачу, Суд должен был убедиться, что
национальные органы власти основывались в своих решениях на
приемлемой оценке относящихся к делу фактов (см. mutatis mutandis
упомянутое выше Судебное решение по делу Объединенная
коммунистическая партия против Турции, п. 47).
45. Суд и ранее утверждал, что одной из основных характерных
черт демократии является возможность, которую она открывает для
решения проблем страны через диалог, не прибегая к насилию, даже
когда этот диалог вызывает раздражение. Демократия процветает в
условиях свободы выражения мнений. С этой точки зрения не может
быть никакого оправдания созданию препятствий политической группе
исключительно потому, что она стремится обсуждать публично
ситуацию, затрагивающую часть населения государства, и участвовать
в политической жизни страны, чтобы, руководствуясь
демократическими правилами, найти решения, способные удовлетворить
каждого заинтересованного человека (см. там же, п. 57).
46. Проанализировав заявления г-на Перинчека, Суд не нашел в
них ничего, что могло бы рассматриваться как призыв к
использованию насилия, восстанию или любой другой форме отказа от
демократических принципов. Напротив, он в ряде случаев подчеркнул
необходимость политической реформы, проводимой в соответствии с
демократическими нормами, путем выборов и референдумов. В то же
самое время он высказывался против "прежней культуры преклонения
перед насилием и предостерегал от силового решения проблем
межнационального и социального характера" (см. п. 13 выше).
Во время разбирательства представитель Правительства заявил,
что г-н Перинчек "оправдывал использование насильственных и
террористических методов", в частности заявляя: "Курды проявили
себя в борьбе обедневших крестьян, связав их судьбу [со своей].
Объединив тысячи людей в городах и провинциях, курды показали, на
что они способны, и сломили барьеры страха". Более того, призывая
присутствующих "взращивать мужество, а не арбузы", г-н Перинчек,
по утверждению Правительства, "побуждал их прекратить всю свою
деятельность и заняться разрушением общественного строя". Наконец,
его фраза "курдский народ поднимается" была истолкована как призыв
к восстанию.
Хотя Суд признал, что эти фразы были адресованы гражданам
курдского происхождения, побуждали их к сплочению и отстаиванию
политических требований, он не обнаружил в них какого-либо
подстрекательства к применению насилия или нарушению
демократических принципов. В этом отношении относящиеся к делу
заявления почти не отличались от заявлений других политических
групп, существующих в других странах Совета Европы.
47. Конституционный Суд также подверг критике г-на Перинчека за
то, что он в своих речах проводил различие между двумя нациями,
курдской и турецкой, и выступал за решение проблем меньшинств
учреждением курдско-турецкой федерации в ущерб единству турецкой
нации и территориальной целостности государства. В конечном счете
СП отстаивала идеи сепаратизма.
Суд отметил, что в совокупности эти заявления составляли
политическую программу, основной целью которой было учреждение в
соответствии с демократическими принципами федеральной системы, в
которой турки и курды имели бы равное представительство на
добровольной основе. Конечно, возникал вопрос о праве "курдской
нации" на самоопределение и ее праве на "отделение"; однако эти
слова, употребленные в контексте заявлений, не поощряют отделение
от Турции, а стремятся скорее подчеркнуть, что предложенная
федеральная система не может возникнуть без свободно выраженного
согласия курдов через референдум.
По мнению Суда, тот факт, что такая политическая программа
оценивается как несовместимая с существующими принципами и
структурами турецкого государства, не делает ее несовместимой с
принципами демократии. Сущность демократии в том, чтобы позволить
выдвигать и обсуждать разнообразные политические программы, даже
те, которые подвергают сомнению тот порядок, согласно которому
организовано в настоящее время государство, при условии, что они
не наносят ущерба самой демократии.
48. Не исключено, как и в случае с Объединенной
коммунистической партией Турции (см. вышеупомянутое Решение, с.
27, п. 58), что за данными заявлениями могли скрываться цели и
намерения, отличные от тех, которые провозглашались публично.
Однако в отсутствие конкретных действий, ставящих под сомнение то,
что заявлял г-н Перинчек, не следует подвергать сомнению
искренность его слов. СП была, таким образом, наказана за
поведение, относящееся исключительно к осуществлению права на
свободу выражения своего мнения.
49. Суд также отметил, что г-н Перинчек был оправдан в судах
государственной безопасности, где он подвергся судебному
преследованию по поводу тех же самых заявлений (см. п. 11 выше). В
связи с этим Правительство тогда подчеркнуло, что данные два вида
разбирательства совершенно различны, одно сводилось к применению
уголовного права, другое - к применению конституционного права.
Суд обращает внимание лишь на то, что турецкие суды разошлись во
мнении относительно смысла утверждений г-на Перинчека.
Важно определить, можно ли в свете вышеупомянутых соображений
рассматривать роспуск СП как необходимый в демократическом
обществе, т.е. отвечал ли он "насущной социальной потребности" и
был ли он "соразмерен правомерно преследуемой цели" (см. среди
многих других источников и mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Фогт
против Германии от 26 сентября 1995 г. Серия A, т. 323, с. 25 -
26, п. 52).
50. Суд напоминает, что, учитывая важную роль политических
партий в успешном функционировании демократии (см. вышеупомянутое
Судебное решение по делу Объединенной коммунистической партии
Турции, п. 25), исключения, изложенные в статье 11, в отношении
политических партий должны подвергаться узкому толкованию; только
убедительные и веские причины могут оправдывать ограничения на
свободу ассоциаций. Определяя, существует ли необходимость
ограничений по смыслу статьи 11 п. 2, государства - участники
обладают лишь ограниченным пределом усмотрения, осуществляемого в
условиях строгого контроля со стороны европейских органов,
охватывающего как правовые нормы, так и решения по их применению,
включая те, которые выносят независимые суды (см. вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Объединенной коммунистической партии Турции, п.
46).
51. Суд отметил, что рассматриваемое судебное вмешательство в
свободу выражения мнения было радикальным: Решение о роспуске СП
вступало в силу немедленно и было окончательным, ее имущество было
передано ipso jure Казначейству и ее руководителям, в число
которых во время роспуска партии г-н Перинчек по общему признанию
не входил (см. п. 14 выше), было запрещено продолжать заниматься
некоторыми видами политической деятельности. Столь суровые меры
могут применяться лишь в наиболее серьезных случаях.
52. Суд уже отметил, что у него не сложилось впечатления, что
заявления г-на Перинчека, хотя и критические по своей
направленности и содержащие большое количество требований,
подвергали сомнению необходимость следовать демократическим
принципам и правилам. Суд готов принять во внимание обстановку в
стране, особенно трудности, связанные с предотвращением терроризма
(см. Решение по делу Объединенная коммунистическая партия против
Турции, с. 27, п. 59). Однако в настоящем деле не установлено, как
рассматриваемые утверждения, автор которых заявляет о
приверженности демократии и неприятии насилия, могут быть
ответственны за проблему терроризма в стране.
53. В свете упомянутых выше выводов нет необходимости
обращаться к статье 17; заявления не содержат ничего, что давало
бы основание для вывода, что их автор, пренебрегая Конвенцией,
занялся разрушительной деятельностью в отношении прав и свобод,
предусмотренных Конвенцией (см. mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Объединенная коммунистическая партия против
Турции, с. 27, п. 60).
54. Таким образом, Решение о роспуске СП было несоразмерно
преследуемой цели и следовательно не было необходимым в
демократическом обществе. Из этого следует, что имело место
нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении
статей 9, 10, 14 и 18 Конвенции
55. Заявители также утверждали, что имели место нарушения
статей 9, 10, 14 и 18 Конвенции. Поскольку их жалобы касаются тех
же самых фактов, Суд не счел нужным рассматривать их отдельно.
III. О предполагаемом нарушении
статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1
56. Заявители далее утверждали, что последствия роспуска СП -
ее имущество было конфисковано и передано Казначейству, и ее
руководителям было запрещено принимать участие в выборах -
повлекло за собой нарушение статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1, которые
предусматривают:
Статья 1
"Каждое физическое или юридическое лицо имеет право
беспрепятственно пользоваться своим имуществом. Никто не может
быть лишен своего имущества, иначе как в интересах общества и на
условиях, предусмотренных законом и общими принципами
международного права.
Предыдущие положения ни в коей мере не ущемляют права
государства обеспечивать выполнение таких законов, какие ему
представляются необходимыми для осуществления контроля за
использованием собственности в соответствии с общими интересами
или для обеспечения уплаты налогов или других сборов или штрафов".
Статья 3
"Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны обязуются проводить с
разумной периодичностью свободные выборы путем тайного голосования
в таких условиях, которые обеспечивали бы свободное волеизъявление
народа при выборе законодательной власти".
57. Суд обратил внимание на то, что меры, на которые жаловались
заявители, были побочным результатом роспуска СП, который, как
постановил Суд, был осуществлен в нарушение статьи 11,
следовательно, нет необходимости рассматривать эти жалобы
отдельно.
IV. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
58. Наконец, заявители жаловались, что вместо проведения
публичного разбирательства Конституционный Суд заслушал дело при
закрытых дверях; они не имели доступа к судебному досье и полному
стенографическому отчету слушания. Они полагали, что это
составляет нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
59. Правительство и Комиссия считают, что статья 6 п. 1 не
применима к обстоятельствам дела.
60. На основании своего заключения относительно соблюдения
статьи 11 Суд полагает, что нет необходимости рассматривать эту
жалобу.
V. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
61. Статья 50 Конвенции предусматривает:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
A. Аннулирование решения о роспуске
62. Заявители прежде всего ходатайствовали об аннулировании
Решения Конституционного Суда от 10 июля 1992 г. о роспуске СП.
Они также добивались "статуса признанной политической партии " для
СП.
63. Суд констатировал, что он не правомочен согласно Конвенции
принимать такие меры (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Саиди
против Франции от 20 сентября 1993 г. Серия A, т. 261-C, с. 57, п.
47).
B. Ущерб, издержки и расходы
64. Что касается возмещения материального ущерба, то заявители
потребовали 1500000 долларов США: 1000000 в пользу СП и по 250000
г-ну Догу Перинчеку и г-ну Илхану Кириту. Они также потребовали
6000000 долларов США в качестве возмещения морального вреда.
В поддержку своих требований они подчеркнули, что СП имела
более 400 отделений по всей Турции, все ее имущество было
конфисковано; она имела право выставлять кандидатов на выборах,
принимала в них участие и на момент роспуска была единственной
существующей левой социалистической партией. Согласно заявителям,
тысячам людей, которые помогли создать СП, просуществовавшую
четыре года, и руководителям этой партии был причинен существенный
моральный вред и финансовые убытки.
Заявители также требовали "компенсации всех затрат, которые они
понесли в связи с делом". При разбирательстве в Суде, они
объяснили, что гонорар и затраты 308 адвокатов, которые
представляли СП только в Конституционном Суде, составили сумму в
1955800 французских франков. Что касается затрат в связи с
представительством заявителей в учреждениях Конвенции, то они
составили сумму в 300000 французских франков.
65. Правительство заняло принципиальную позицию, что в данном
случае никакая компенсация не должна выплачиваться. В субсидиарном
порядке оно полагало требования заявителей непомерными. Во втором
субсидиарном порядке оно утверждало, что нарушение статьи 11 не
дает заявителям права требовать индивидуального возмещения.
Относительно возмещения предполагаемого материального ущерба
Правительство утверждало, что не существует никакой причинной
связи между ним и роспуском СП, что политические партии и их
руководителей нельзя приравнивать к коммерческим предприятиям и
что в любом случае их требования не подтверждены никакими точными
расчетами.
Что касается требований относительно возмещения морального
вреда, то Правительство полагало, что они заслуживали "еще
меньшего доверия", т.к. они не только непомерны, но и включали
требование о возмещении морального ущерба, предположительно
причиненного непосредственно СП.
Наконец, что касается требований о возмещении издержек и
расходов, Правительство сочло их недостаточно уточненными.
66. Представитель Комиссии утверждал, что требования заявителей
носят весьма общий и гипотетический характер и недостаточно
обоснованны для их удовлетворения в соответствии со статьей 50.
67. Суд обратил внимание на то, что заявители не представили
никаких доказательств по обоснованию своих требований на
значительные суммы в виде возмещения материального ущерба,
издержек и расходов. Отсюда вытекает, что он не может поддержать
эти требования (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу "Прессос
Компания Навьера А.О." и другие против Бельгии от 3 июля 1997 г.
Reports, 1997-IV, с. 1299, п. 24). Однако он отметил, что
заявители получили 57187 французских франков от Совета Европы в
качестве судебной помощи.
Что касается возмещения морального вреда, то Суд отметил, что в
отличие от ОКПТ устав и программа СП не вызвали возражений
Конституционного Суда, и партия осуществляла свою деятельность в
течение четырех лет до ее роспуска по Решению этого суда. Г-н
Перинчек и г-н Кирит поэтому не понесли никакого определенного
морального ущерба. Основывая свой расчет на праве справедливости,
Суд оценивает сумму ущерба в 50000 французских франков каждому.
C. Проценты за просрочку
68. Согласно информации, имеющейся у Суда, установленная
законом процентная ставка, существующая во Франции на дату
принятия настоящего Решения, составляет 3,36% в год.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции;
2. Постановил, что нет необходимости исследовать, имело ли
место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1, статей 9, 10, 14 и 18 Конвенции и
статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1;
3. Постановил:
a) что государство - ответчик должно выплатить г-ну Перинчеку и
г-ну Кириту в течение трех месяцев общую сумму в 50000 (пятьдесят
тысяч) французских франков каждому в качестве возмещения за
моральный вред, которая должна быть конвертирована в турецкие лиры
по курсу на день платежа; и
b) что к указанной сумме прибавляются простые проценты по
ставке в 3,36% годовых с момента истечения вышеупомянутых трех
месяцев до совершения платежа;
4. Отклонил остальные требования справедливого возмещения.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 мая 1998 г.
Председатель
Рудольф БЕРНХАРДТ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF SOCIALIST PARTY AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
JUDGMENT <*>
(Strasbourg, 25.V.1998)
In the case of Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey <1>,
--------------------------------
<*> The present judgment is subject to editorial revision
before its reproduction in final form in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998. These reports are obtainable from the publisher
Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (Luxemburger Strasse 449, D-50939 {Koln}),
who will also arrange for their distribution in association with
the agents for certain countries as listed overleaf.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Rule 51 of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Grand Chamber composed of
the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 20/1997/804/1007. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> Rules of Court A apply to all cases referred to the Court
before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol. They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1
January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
Mr {F. Golcuklu} <*>,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr I. Foighel,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
Mr L. Wildhaber,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr {P. Kuris},
Mr {U. Lohmus},
Mr P. Van dijk,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 26 February and 25 April 1998,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
lastmentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 27 January 1997,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 з 1 and
Article 47 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). It originated in an
application (no. 21237/93) against the Republic of Turkey lodged
with the Commission under Article 25 by a political party, the
Socialist Party, and two Turkish nationals, Mr {Dogu Perincek} and
Mr {Ilhan Kirit}, on 31 December 1992.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (a) of
the Convention and to Rule 32 of Rules of Court A. The object of
the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of
the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its
obligations under Article 6 з 1 and Articles 9, 10, 11, 14 and 18
of the Convention, and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1.
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 з
3 (d), the applicants stated that they wished to take part in the
proceedings and designated the lawyers who would represent them
(Rule 30).
3. On 30 January 1997 the President of the Court decided in the
interests of the proper administration of justice that the present
case should be heard by the Chamber constituted on 29 October 1996
to consider the case of United Communist Party of Turkey and
Others v. Turkey <3> (Rule 21 з 7). That Chamber included ex
officio Mr {F. Golcuklu}, the elected judge of Turkish nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President
of the Court (Rule 21 з 4 (b)). The other seven members, whose
names had been drawn by lot in the presence of the Registrar, were
Mr B. Walsh, Mr C. Russo, Mr I. Foighel, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr J.
Makarczyk, Mr {P. Kuris} and Mr P. van Dijk (Article 43 in fine of
the Convention and Rule 21 з 5).
--------------------------------
<3> Case no. 133/1996/752/951.
4. On 28 August 1997 the Chamber decided to relinquish
jurisdiction forthwith in favour of a Grand Chamber (Rule 51). The
Grand Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr Ryssdal,
the President of the Court, and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-
President, together with the members and the four substitutes of
the original Chamber, the latter being Mr A.B. Baka, Mr M.A. Lopes
Rocha, Mr R. Pekkanen and Mr R. Macdonald (Rule 51 з 2 (a) and
(b)). On the same day the President, in the presence of the
Registrar, drew by lot the names of the seven additional judges
needed to complete the Grand Chamber, namely Mr F. Matscher, Mr N.
Valticos, Mrs E. Palm, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Sir John Freeland, Mr L.
Wildhaber and Mr {U. Lohmus} (Rule 51 з 2 (c)). Subsequently Mr
Ryssdal, Mr Walsh and Mr Macdonald were unable to take part in the
further consideration of the case (Rules 24 з 1 and 51 з 3). Mr
Ryssdal's place as President of the Grand Chamber was taken by Mr
Bernhardt (Rules 21 з 6 and 51 з 6).
5. As President of the Chamber Mr Ryssdal, acting through the
Registrar, had consulted the Agent of the Turkish Government ("the
Government"), the applicants' lawyers and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 з 1
and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar
received the applicants' and the Government's memorials on 1 and 3
October 1997 respectively. 6. In accordance with the President's
decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on 25 February 1998. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mrs {D. Akcay},
Mr {M. Ozmen}, Co-Agents,
Mr A. Kaya,
Mrs {M. Gulsen},
Ms {A. Emuler},
Ms {A. Gunyakti}, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mr G. Ress, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr {D. Perincek}, Applicant,
Mr A. Kalan and
Mr M. Cengiz, both of the Ankara Bar, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Ress, Mr {Perincek}, Mr Cengiz,
Mr Kalan and Mrs {Akcay}.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
7. The Socialist Party ("the SP"), the first applicant, was a
political party that was dissolved by the Constitutional Court
(see paragraph 15 below). Mr {Ilhan Kirit} and Mr {Dogu Perincek},
the second and third applicants, were respectively Chairman and
former Chairman of the SP. They live in Istanbul.
8. The SP was formed on 1 February 1988. On the same day, its
constitution and programme were submitted to the office of
Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation for assessment
of their compatibility with the Constitution and Law no. 2820 on
the regulation of political parties ("Law no. 2820" - see
paragraphs 16 and 17 below).
A. First application to have the Socialist Party
dissolved and the prosecution of its leaders
9. On 15 February 1988, when the SP was preparing to take part
in a general election, Principal State Counsel at the Court of
Cassation ("Principal State Counsel") applied to the
Constitutional Court for an order dissolving the SP. Relying in
particular on passages from its programme, he accused the party of
having sought to establish the domination of the working class
with a view to establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat
(Articles 6, 10 and 14 and former Article 68 of the Constitution
and sections 78 and 101(a) of Law no. 2820).
10. In a judgment of 8 December 1988, published in the Official
Gazette of 16 May 1989, the Constitutional Court dismissed the
application as unfounded, as it considered that the political
objectives stated in the SP's programme did not infringe the
Constitution.
11. Criminal proceedings were then brought in the National
Security Courts against some of the leaders of the SP, including
Mr {Perincek}. They were accused of spreading harmful propaganda
in favour of the domination of one social class over the others,
contrary to Article 142 of the Turkish Criminal Code, as then
worded (see paragraph 18 below). The allegation against Mr
{Perincek} was based in particular on speeches he had made at two
public meetings on 10 February 1990 at {Diyabakir} and 21 March
1990 at Van and on an article that had appeared in a political
journal on 4 March 1990, that is to say before his election as
Chairman of the SP on 6 July 1991. Following the repeal of Article
142 of the Criminal Code by Law no. 3713 of 12 April 1991 (the
Prevention of Terrorism Act), the accused were all acquitted. The
SP later published the speeches in question under the titles:
"{Serhildan cagrilari}-1, {Kawa atesi yakti}" and "{Serhildan
cagrilari}-2, {Karpuz degil cesaret ekin}" (see paragraph 13
below).
12. On 26 August 1991 the High Electoral Committee - which had
responsibility under the Constitution for ensuring the fairness of
elections - decided that the SP satisfied all the conditions
necessary to take part in the general election of 20 October 1991.
The party consequently ran an election campaign.
B. Second application to have the
Socialist Party dissolved
13. On 14 November 1991 Principal State Counsel applied to the
Constitutional Court for a second time for an order dissolving the
SP. He accused the party of having carried on activities likely to
undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of
the nation contrary to Articles 3, 4, 14 and 66 and former Article
68 of the Constitution, and sections 78, 81 and 101(b) of Law no.
2820.
In support of his application, Principal State Counsel relied
in particular on the following extracts from the SP's election
publications and from oral statements made by its Chairman, Mr
{Perincek}, at public meetings and on television.
1. Extracts from Socialist Party publications
a) "{Serhildan cagrilari}-1, {Kawa atesi yakti}" ("Calls to
stand up - no. 1, Kawa <4> has lit the fire")
--------------------------------
<4> A mythological hero.
"... Dear friends, ... the second dynamic is the Kurdish
dynamic. It is the call for equality and freedom, [it is] the
Kurds' claim to rights as a nation. It is a request that the
rights which the Turks enjoy ... be granted to the Kurds also.
At the beginning of the century, a war of independence was
waged ... in circumstances in which imperialists occupied the
country and Turks and Kurds depended on one another and had to
unite and fight, side by side. The Amasya Protocol provided: "The
homeland is composed of the lands where the Turks and the Kurds
live." At the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, oral and written
declarations were made recognising the ethnic social and
geographical rights of Kurds ... once the war was over and the men
had hung up their weapons, an official ideology developed ... as
though there was no longer any need for people from Urfa,
{Diyarbakir} or Malatya to fight ... Under that official ideology,
there was no longer any room for Kurds. There were no more Kurds.
Henceforth, only Turks existed..." (pages 7 - 8)
b) "{Serhildan cagrilari}-2, Karpuz degil cesaret ekin" ("Calls
to stand up - no. 2, sow courage, not watermelons")
"... they can make this country ... a homeland of cultures,
brotherhood, workers, [a homeland] where there is voluntary unity,
where nations freely decide on their future and freely unite if
they so wish ... Long live brotherhood between Turks and Kurds!
Long live the Turkish and Kurdish peoples!" (page 31)
c) "{Cozum-4, Kurt sorunu}" ("Solution no. 4, the Kurdish
problem")
"... The collapse started where the regime was most tyrannical
and most vulnerable. The [political] parties of the status quo
failed to the east of the Euphrates... [They] are no longer to be
seen in the lands where the Kurdish people live ... (page 3)
Why have the parties of the status quo disappeared from the
Kurdish provincesi? Because they are nationalists... Turkish
nationalism has become bankrupt in the lands where the Kurdish
problem will be resolved. Turkish nationalism has drawn its
borders. It has divided Anatolia into two parts, situated to the
east and west of the Euphrates. Turkish nationalism and its regime
are in the process of drowning in the Euphrates. That is what is
known as a bankrupt regime. (page 4)
... After the mountains, the State also lost the villages and
towns. That is why it counts directly on deterring the masses.
State terror seeks to establish a new regime in Turkey, starting
from the east ... (page 10)
The State pays village guards and special forces ... which it
feeds to kill Kurds through the taxes it collects from the people.
The cost of the bullets fired at Kurds, of petrol used in cross-
border operations ..., in short, the cost of [this] special war is
borne by the people ... To bring inflation and ... poverty to an
end, a peaceful solution must be found to the Kurdish problem. The
Kurdish problem is at the same time a Turkish problem ... Living
freely, in brotherhood, heart to heart, in peace and harmony with
the Kurdish people is a need ... for the Turkish people ... Turks
and Kurds are but one people. No Turk will be entitled to enter
paradise if a single Kurd [still] remains in hell. The Socialist
Party is determined to fight until the last Kurd is saved from
hell. (pages 11 - 13)
The Socialist Party is present on both sides of the Euphrates.
It is the party of brotherhood between Kurds and Turks. The
Socialist Party's determination in the face of the Kurdish problem
has been demonstrated by its fight to combat State pressure on the
Kurdish nation ..., its shared destiny in the poor Kurdish
peasants' fight for survival ..., the fact that it has overcome
the barrier of fear by holding meetings with thousands of people
in the Kurdish villages and towns and has explained the Kurdish
problem to working people throughout Turkey ... Our party imparts
this awareness. It sees a solution in the common destiny of
peoples and their combat. To remedy the Kurdish problem, the
Socialist Party has courage, ... a cause and a programme. (pages
15 - 16)
The Kurdish nation has a full and unconditional right to self-
determination. It may, if it wishes, create a separate State. The
interest of the proletariat lies in the establishment, through
democratic popular revolution, of a voluntary union founded on
absolute equality of rights and freedoms. The right to secede is,
at all times, an essential condition of that voluntary union.
Whether or not people live together depends on the free will of
nations. So that that will can be expressed, a referendum must be
organised in the Kurdish provinces. During the referendum, those
who are in favour of secession must also be allowed freely to
express their views.
Under current historical conditions, a solution favourable to
the workers of both nations lies in a democratic federal republic,
to which the two federated States adhere on an equal footing. In
the federation, power will be exercised through popular assemblies
elected democratically by districts, towns, federated States and
the federal State, beginning with the neighbourhoods and villages.
The prefectures and sub-prefectures, State governments and the
federal government will be the executive bodies of those
assemblies and accountable to them.
The popular federal assembly will be composed of two
assemblies... the assembly of the members of parliament and the
assembly of the nations.
The assembly of the members of parliament will be elected in a
general election with one member of parliament elected by a given
number of citizens.
The assembly of nations will be constituted by an equal number
of members elected from each of the two federated States.
Legislation will be enacted on a majority vote in the two
assemblies.
Legislation which is rejected by one of the assemblies will not
come into force. The Employment Code, and the Criminal, Civil and
Procedural Codes will apply throughout the country and be adopted
by the federal bodies.
In those districts and provinces of each State where minority
groups are in the majority, regional self-determination will be
permitted if the people so desire.
The federal Constitution will be the common Constitution of the
two nations. It will come into force as soon it has been accepted,
by referendum, by a majority in each of the two nations. Each
State will also have its own Constitution. The federal
Constitution will cover an increasing number of matters, to the
extent that the federated republics consent thereto.
The flag and national anthem of the federal republic will be
the same for Turks and Kurds. Each federated State will have its
own flag and anthem. The federation shall not have a name that
refers to only one of the nations.
Defence of the country, issues of war and peace, and entry into
representative treaties in international relations will be the
responsibility of the federal bodies.
Each federated State will [however] be entitled to establish
direct commercial and cultural relations with foreign countries
and to open consulates.
At each level of government, power will lie solely with the
popular assemblies and the local authorities accountable to them.
The prefecture, sub-prefectures, security forces and gendarmerie
established under the current [central] government outside the
scope of the proposed administrative system will be abolished.
This democratic administrative system will also guarantee national
equality and freedom.
Local security forces will receive their orders from local
government authorities and be accountable to local assemblies. In
the villages, security forces will be composed of local young
people, who will receive instructions from village committees.
Seigniory, dependence on the head of a clan or any form of
medieval relation that is incompatible with brotherhood or social
development shall be abolished by an agrarian reform to be
undertaken by the mobilisation of farmers under the direction of
the village committees.
In order that regional inequalities that have been aggravated
by the market economy may be removed, the federal republic will
increase its share of investment in regions that are economically
underdeveloped. It will therefore guarantee and develop the
economic basis of the union.
With respect to the economy, a federal system of uniform
statistics will be used.
The freedom and right of each nation and each national or
religious minority to develop its language and culture and to
pursue political and associative activities will be guaranteed.
The official languages will be Turkish and Kurdish. Each
federated republic will have its own language as its official
language. Decisions of the federal bodies will be drafted in both
languages. From primary school to university and in all cultural
institutions, means of education, research and communication, such
as journalism, publishing, radio and television, etc., will be
provided in both languages.
The democratic culture of the Kurdish nation will be able to
develop through the removal of the pressures that have been
exerted on it up till now. Those in power will strive for free
democratic cultural exchange with Turks and Kurds in other
countries and an international culture common to all nations of
the world to flourish in a pluralist and active environment.
All bodies in power will endeavour [on the one hand] to
eradicate, with all its foundations, the former culture idolising
violence and advocating the use of force to solve problems between
nations and in society and [on the other hand] to spread among the
people an internationalist proletarian culture that respects
mankind and despises violence.
Against the fundamentalist nationalist culture according to
which the history of the lands in which we live began with the war
of Malazgirt and against all other forms of nationalism will be
developed an internationalist, universal, humanitarian and
democratic culture that will seek new cultural sources, enriched
by the contribution of different peoples stemming from the
historic depths of our country, and will draw on those resources.
Original names will no longer be changed as they reflect the
wealth of our country's universal culture; every place will be
called by its known, established name." (pages 16 - 20)
2. Oral statements by the Chairman
of the Socialist Party
(a) At the opening ceremony of the Socialist Party Congress (24
- 25 August 1991)
"The Socialist Party is the last bridge between the Kurdish and
Turkish people... The current status quo has failed with respect
to the Kurdish problem and its deafening collapse can be heard
from here... What is the only possible solution? ... This issue
can only be resolved by respecting the wish of the Kurdish people
... the real remedy lies with the Kurdish people. We will ask the
Kurds: "What do you want?" ... if, conversely, they seek
secession, we will respect their wish. We will organise a
referendum. We will ask the Kurdish people ..., everyone, from
Hakkari to Antep: "Do you want to create a separate State in our
land or not?" The Socialist Party prefers unification: Who is
inciting secession? Oppression [is]. The oppression of the Kurdish
people by the Turkish State. We will defend unification by putting
an end to that oppression and that will be proof of [our]
acceptance of the Kurdish people's will... The Socialist Party
will defend the union of the two peoples within the federation and
the joint [exercise] of power... The Socialist Party is the last
bridge between the Kurdish and Turkish people... No party other
than the Socialist Party has shared the Kurds' destiny, taken up a
position against the Turkish State or is able to maintain that
position."
(b) During a television programme on 11 October 1991
"... Let us now define [what they call] internal security. That
is the Kurdish problem. If you put it in terms of internal
security ..., you will have recourse to the gendarmes. If the
problem is seen as a Kurdish one, you will resolve it by democracy
and freedom. In fact, it is the present regime that has
transformed the Euphrates into a border... It was an economic
border... Then, they made the Euphrates a political border ...
and, lastly, an ideological one... Turkish nationalism has drowned
in the Euphrates; it cannot cross it ... because nationalism has
no place in these lands... There is a Turkish problem but also a
Kurdish problem ... a fraternal solution will come from the
Socialist Party. The [other] five parties have become separatist
... because they were nationalist. We offer a fraternal solution,
a federation. The Kurdish nation should be given the right to self-
determination. That is how the right conditions for unification
will come about... Union cannot be achieved through force. Your
solutions have failed. You will see, the Socialist Party solution
will prevail."
(c) At a public meeting in Ankara on 13 October 1991
"... we will put a stop to the special war being [waged] in the
east ... we will end it by replacing it with a programme of
brotherhood between Kurds and Turks ... and, lastly, on a
structural level, a federation in which both nations are on an
equal footing... They say that they are troubled by the fact that
the Euphrates is a border. Who made the Euphrates a border? They
did! ... Free, voluntary union on an equal footing of the Kurdish
and Turkish nations within a federation, provided that the Kurdish
nation consents and so decides as master of its destiny and
accepts it... that is the solution proposed by the Socialist
Party. The two peoples, two nations are obliged [to accept]..."
(d) During a television programme on 13 October 1991
"... Because the Kurds of the village of Botan are standing up
they are in the process of becoming their own masters... Is it
you, the status quo, that has forbidden the use of the name
"Kurd"? The Kurdish people are standing up; they are becoming the
centre of the debate; through their acts, they are imposing their
identity and celebrating the Newroz ... The oppressed Kurds are
establishing their Constitution, making laws."
--------------------------------
<5> Name given to traditional New Year celebrations in the
Middle East.
(e) At a public meeting at {Sirnak} on 16 October 1991
"... The Socialist Party says that the Kurdish problem cannot
be resolved by soldiers or bullets. The solution lies in
independence ... in equality. The Kurdish and Turkish nations
should have the same rights. The Kurdish and Turkish nations will
form a popular republic ... and then one of them will survive and
the other be oppressed; that is indefensible... It is the
Socialist Party that is with the oppressed Kurdish people... By
standing up, the Kurdish people have begun to demonstrate the
combat they have been waging for years... The Kurdish people will
bring about a new revolution... The oppressed Kurdish people ...
are coming to join the Socialist Party... Long live the awakening!
Long live our people!"
(f) At a public meeting at Van on 17 October 1991
"... Turkish nationalism has drowned in the Euphrates... The
State has oppressed the Kurdish people to the point of erasing
their name, even of prohibiting its use; but bans come to
nothing... The Kurdish reality is there and is asserting itself...
Turks and Kurds remain brothers; there can be no brotherhood where
there is slavery; there can be no brotherhood if one is master and
the other slave; everyone should be equal and have the same
rights... There can be no hope if Turks and Kurds do not unite...
This equation should be noted down somewhere... the Turkish people
plus the oppressed Kurdish people equals democracy, independence
and freedom... Long live Kurdistan! ..."
Relying on an audiovisual recording of the latter meeting, Mr
{Perincek} nevertheless denied, at a hearing before the
Constitutional Court on 12 May 1992, that he had uttered the last
sentence.
C. Dissolution of the Socialist Party
14. On 28 November 1991 the Constitutional Court sent Principal
State Counsel's application to the SP, whose counsel filed
preliminary written observations on 29 January 1992 and full
observations on 30 March 1992, in which they first requested a
hearing or, at the very least, leave to make further submissions
orally. The Constitutional Court acceded to the latter request
only and heard the party Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, on 12 May, who
had ceased to be Chairman of the party a short time before.
Before the Constitutional Court the SP's representatives
firstly contested the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Law no. 2820 on which Principal State Counsel relied. They also
argued that the court should not admit the SP's publications (see
paragraph 13 above) in evidence against that party. They said that
two of the publications were copies of a speech made by Mr
{Perincek} before his election as party Chairman on 6 July 1991;
furthermore, they had been examined by the National Security
Courts and found not to contravene the law (see paragraph 11
above).
The party representatives went on to point out that on 8
December 1988 the Constitutional Court had dismissed the first
application to have the SP dissolved on the basis of its programme
(see paragraph 10 above). They maintained that the court would be
contradicting itself if it now decided to dissolve the SP purely
because of Mr {Perincek's} oral statements, which, in the case
before the court, were merely reiterations of paragraph 31 of the
programme, which had already been reviewed by the Constitutional
Court. They noted, lastly, that since the enactment of Law no.
3713 (the Prevention of Terrorism Act) which had, in particular,
repealed Article 142 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 18
below), it was no longer illegal to carry on Marxist-Leninist
activities; in their submission, if one political party was
treated differently from the others, the aim pursued by the
Turkish legislature would be defeated.
15. Pursuant to section 101 of Law no. 2820, the Constitutional
Court made an order on 10 July 1992 dissolving the SP, which
entailed ipso jure the liquidation of the party and the transfer
of its assets to the Treasury, in accordance with section 107 of
that Law. The order was published in the Official Gazette on 25
October 1992. As a consequence, the founders and managers of the
party were banned from holding similar office in any other
political body (former Article 69 of the Constitution - see
paragraph 16 below).
In its judgment the Constitutional Court noted at the outset
that the impugned publications of the SP bore the name and
signature of its Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, who was also the person
who had made the oral statements on television. Those publications
and statements accordingly also bound the SP and consequently were
admissible as relevant evidence under section 101 of Law no. 2820.
The Constitutional Court did not consider that either its or
the National Security Courts' earlier judgments (see paragraphs 10
- 11 above) in any way affected its examination of the case before
it, which concerned the political activities of the party, not of
its leaders. Moreover, it could not accept that the fact that a
provision of the Criminal Code making it an offence to behave in a
certain way had been repealed meant that similar conduct no longer
constituted a valid ground for dissolution under Law no. 2820.
The Constitutional Court observed that unlike the issue that
had been decided in its judgment of 8 December 1988, the one now
before it was based on new facts and evidence and thus gave rise
to a different question in law. It no longer had to be determined
whether the programme and constitution of the SP were in
conformity with the law, but solely whether its political
activities were caught by the relevant prohibitions.
In reaching its decision on the merits, the Constitutional
Court noted, inter alia, that the SP referred in its political
message to two nations... the Kurdish nation and the Turkish
nation. But it could not be accepted that there were two nations
within the Republic of Turkey, whose citizens, whatever their
ethnic origin, had Turkish nationality. In reality, the statements
made by the SP concerning Kurdish national and cultural rights
were intended to create minorities and, ultimately, the
establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish federation, to the detriment of
the unity of the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of
the Turkish State.
Like all nationals of foreign descent, nationals of Kurdish
origin could freely express their identity, but the Constitution
and the law precluded them from forming a separate nation and
State. The SP was ideologically opposed to the nationalism of
Ataturk, which was the most fundamental principle underpinning the
Republic of Turkey.
The SP's political activity was also incompatible in aim with
Articles 11 and 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
since it was similar to that of terrorist organisations,
notwithstanding a difference in the means employed.
In short, objectives which, like those of the SP, encouraged
separatism and incited a socially integrated community to fight
for the creation of an independent federated State were
unacceptable and justified dissolution of the party concerned.
II. Relevant domestic law
A. The Constitution
16. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as
follows:
Article 2
"The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social
State based on the rule of law, respectful of human rights in a
spirit of social peace, national solidarity and justice, adhering
to the nationalism of {Ataturk} and resting on the fundamental
principles set out in the Preamble."
Article 3 з 1
"The State of Turkey shall constitute with its territory and
nation, an indivisible whole. The official language shall be
Turkish."
Article 4
"No amendment may be made or proposed to the provisions of
Article 1 of the Constitution providing that the State shall be a
Republic, the provisions of Article 2 concerning the
characteristics of the Republic or the provisions of Article 3."
Article 6
"Sovereignty shall reside unconditionally and unreservedly in
the nation.
...
Sovereign power shall not under any circumstances be
transferred to an individual, a group or a social class..."
Article 10 з 1
"All individuals shall be equal before the law without any
distinction based on language, race, colour, sex, political
opinion, philosophical belief, religion, membership of a religious
sect or other similar grounds."
Article 14 з 1
"None of the rights and freedoms referred to in the
Constitution shall be exercised with a view to undermining the
territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the nation,
jeopardising the existence of the Turkish State or Republic,
abolishing fundamental rights and freedoms, placing the control of
the State in the hands of a single individual or group, ensuring
the domination of one social class over other social classes,
introducing discrimination on the grounds of language, race,
religion or membership of a religious sect, or establishing by any
other means a political system based on any of the above concepts
and opinions."
Article 66 з 1
"Everyone linked to the Turkish State by nationality shall be
Turkish."
(Former) Article 68
"...
No political party shall be formed which aims to advocate or
establish the domination of one social class or group, or any form
of dictatorship..."
(Former) Article 69
"Political parties shall not engage in activities other than
those referred to in their constitutions and programmes, nor shall
they disregard the restrictions laid down by Article 14 of the
Constitution, on pain of permanent dissolution.
...
The decisions and internal running of political parties shall
not be contrary to democratic principles.
...
Immediately a political party is formed, Principal State
Counsel shall verify as a matter of priority that its constitution
and programme and the legal position of its founding members are
consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the land. He
shall also monitor its activities.
Political parties may be dissolved by the Constitutional Court,
on an application by Principal State Counsel.
Founding members and managers, at whatever level, of political
parties which have been permanently dissolved may not become
founding members, managers or financial controllers of any new
political party..."
B. Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties
17. The relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 on the regulation
of political parties read as follows:
Section 78
"Political parties
(a) shall not aim, strive or incite third parties to
change the republican form of the Turkish State; the ...
provisions concerning the absolute integrity of the Turkish
State's territory, the absolute unity of its nation, its official
language, its flag or its national anthem; ... the principle that
sovereignty resides unconditionally and unreservedly in the
Turkish nation; ... the provision that sovereign power cannot be
transferred to an individual, a group or a social class...;
jeopardise the existence of the Turkish State and Republic,
abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, introduce discrimination
on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a
religious sect, or establish, by any means, a system of government
based on any such notion or concept.
...
(c) shall not aim to defend or establish the domination of one
social class over the other social classes or the domination of a
community or the setting up of any form of dictatorship; they
shall not carry on activities in pursuit of such aims..."
Section 80
"Political parties shall not aim to change the principle of the
unitary State on which the Turkish Republic is founded, nor carry
on activities in pursuit of such an aim."
Section 81
"Political parties shall not
(a) assert that there exist within the territory of the Turkish
Republic any national minorities based on differences relating to
national or religious culture, membership of a religious sect,
race or language; or
(b) aim to destroy national unity by proposing, on the pretext
of protecting, promoting or disseminating a non-Turkish language
or culture, to create minorities on the territory of the Turkish
Republic or to engage in similar activities..."
Section 90 (1)
"The constitution, programme and activities of political
parties may not contravene the Constitution or this Law."
Section 101
"The Constitutional Court shall dissolve a political party
whose
(a) constitution or programme ... is contrary to the provisions
of Chapter 4 of this Law;
(b) membership, central committee or executive committee ...
take a decision, issue a circular or make a statement ... contrary
to the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law ..., or whose Chairman,
Vice-Chairman or General Secretary makes any written or oral
statement contrary to those provisions...
(c) representative appointed ... by the administrative
committee ..., makes oral statements on radio or television that
are contrary to the provisions ... of this Law..."
Section 107 (1)
"All the assets of political parties dissolved by order of the
Constitutional Court shall be transferred to the Treasury."
Chapter 4 of the Law, which is referred to in section 101,
includes in particular section 90(1), which is reproduced above.
C. The Criminal Code
18. At the material time Article 142 of the Criminal Code
provided:
"Harmful propaganda
1. A person who by any means whatsoever spreads propaganda with
a view to establishing the domination of one social class over the
others, annihilating a social class, overturning the fundamental
social or economic order established in Turkey or destroying the
entire political or judicial order of the State shall, on
conviction, be liable to a term of imprisonment of between five
and ten years.
2. A person who by any means whatsoever spreads propaganda in
favour of the State's being governed by an individual or social
group to the detriment of republicanism or democratic principles
shall, on conviction, be liable to a term of imprisonment of
between five and ten years.
3. Any person who by any means whatsoever spreads propaganda
inspired by racist theories aimed at abolishing in whole or in
part public-law rights as guaranteed by the Constitution or
undermining or eliminating patriotic sentiment shall, on
conviction, be liable to a term of imprisonment of between five
and ten years.
..."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
19. The applicants applied to the Commission on 31 December
1992. They maintained that the dissolution of the SP by the
Constitutional Court had infringed:
(i) Article 6 зз 1 and 2 and Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the
Convention, taken individually and together with Articles 14 and
(in the case of Articles 9, 10 and 11) 18 of the Convention;
(ii) Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1.
20. On 6 December 1994 the Commission declared the complaint
under Article 6 з 2 of the Convention inadmissible and the
remainder of the application (no. 21237/93) admissible.
21. In its report of 26 November 1996 (Article 31), it
expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation of
Article 11 of the Convention but no violation of Article 6 з 1,
that no separate issue arose under Articles 9 and 10 and that it
was unnecessary to consider separately the complaints under
Articles 14 and 18 of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of
Protocol No. 1. The full text of the Commission's opinion is
reproduced as an annex to this judgment <6>.
--------------------------------
<6> Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the
Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
22. In their memorial, the Government "... asked the Court to
declare that there had been no violation of Articles 6, 9, 10, 11,
14 or 18 of the Convention or of Articles 1 or 3 of Protocol No.
1".
23. The applicants asked the Court to hold that there had been
a breach of the rights guaranteed by the aforementioned provisions
of the Convention and Protocol No. 1.
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 11 of the Convention
24. The applicants maintained that the fact that the Socialist
Party ("the SP") had been dissolved and its leaders banned from
holding similar office in any other political party had infringed
their right to freedom of association, as guaranteed by Article 11
of the Convention, which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
to freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights
by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State."
A. Applicability of Article 11
1. Submissions of those appearing before the Court
(a) The applicants
25. The applicants maintained that there was no doubt that
political parties came within the ambit of Article 11.
(b) The Government
26. In their memorial the Government submitted that Article 11
did not in any event apply to political parties. Where in its
constitution or programme a party attacked a State's
constitutional order, the Court should declare the Convention to
be inapplicable ratione materiae or apply Article 17.
27. The SP had intended through its activities unambiguously to
break with Turkey's fundamental constitutional principles. It was
apparent from what the SP said that the party considered that
citizens of Kurdish origin had "nation" and "people" status and
the right to "found a separate State", that it advocated the
setting up of a federation, without moreover excluding the
creation of other federated bodies entitled to open consulates in
other countries. As that amounted to challenging the very basis of
the State, the Constitutional Court had had to review the
constitutionality of that political aim. In so doing, it had
followed the line taken by the German Constitutional Court in its
judgment of 31 October 1991 on the right of foreign nationals to
vote in local elections and by the French Constitutional Council
in its decision of 9 May 1991 on the status of Corsica.
In the Government's submission, the States Parties to the
Convention had at no stage intended to submit their constitutional
institutions, and in particular the principles they considered to
be the essential conditions of their existence, to review by the
Strasbourg institutions. For that reason, where a political party
such as the SP had called those institutions or principles into
question, it could not seek application of the Convention or its
Protocols, since it was not the SP's freedom of association that
was in issue in the present case, but the right to self-
determination, which did not come within the compass of the
Convention.
At the very least, Article 17 of the Convention should be
applied in respect of the SP since the party sought to justify the
use of violence and to promote hatred of the Turkish State and the
wrongful division of an entire people into two opposing camps. In
so doing, the SP had said the same things as the Workers' Party of
Kurdistan ("the PKK"), without distancing itself from any of the
latter's methods. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had, in its
judgment ordering the dissolution of the SP, recognised that
Article 17 was relevant in the case of the SP and concluded that
the party's activities were covered by that provision.
(c) The Commission
28. The Commission expressed the opinion that there was nothing
in the wording of Article 11 to limit its scope to a particular
form of association or group or to suggest that it did not apply
to political parties. On the contrary, if Article 11 was
considered to be a legal safeguard that ensured the proper
functioning of democracy, political parties were one of the most
important forms of association it protected. In that connection,
the Commission referred to a number of decisions in which it had
examined, under Article 11, various restrictions on the activities
of political parties and even the dissolution of such parties,
thereby implicitly accepting that Article 11 applied to that type
of association (see the German Communist Party case, application
no. 250/57, Yearbook 1, p. 225; the Greek case, Yearbook 12, p.
170, з 392; the France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the
Netherlands v. Turkey case, applications nos. 9940-9944/82,
Decisions and Reports 35, p. 143).
At the hearing before the Court the Delegate of the Commission
also said that it was unnecessary to apply Article 17 of the
Convention, since neither the SP's programme nor the statements
made by Mr {Perincek} that were in issue indicated that they had
sought to destroy the rights and freedoms protected by the
Convention.
2. The Court's assessment
29. In its judgment in the case of United Communist Party of
Turkey and Others v. Turkey, the Court held that political parties
are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of
democracy and that in view of the importance of democracy in the
Convention system, there can be no doubt that political parties
come within the scope of Article 11. The Court noted on the other
hand that an association, including a political party, is not
excluded from the protection afforded by the Convention simply
because its activities are regarded by the national authorities as
undermining the constitutional structures of the State and calling
for the imposition of restrictions (see the United Communist Party
of Turkey and Others v. Turkey judgment of 30 January 1998,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, p. 17, зз 25 and 27).
The Court sees no reason to come to a different conclusion in the
instant case.
As to the application of Article 17, the Court will deal with
it after considering the question of compliance with Article 11
(see paragraph 53 below).
B. Compliance with Article 11
1. Whether there was an interference
30. All those appearing before the Court acknowledged that the
SP's dissolution amounted to an interference in the three
applicants' right to freedom of association. That is also the
Court's view.
2. Whether the interference was justified
31. Such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11
unless it was "prescribed by law", pursued one or more legitimate
aims under paragraph 2 and was "necessary in a democratic society"
for the achievement of those aims.
(a) "Prescribed by law"
32. It was common ground that the interference was "prescribed
by law", as the measures ordered by the Constitutional Court were
based on Articles 2, 3 з 1, 6, 10 з 1 and 14 з 1 and former
Article 68 of the Constitution and sections 78, 81 and 96(3) of
Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties (see
paragraphs 16 - 17 above).
(b) Legitimate aim
33. The Government maintained that the interference pursued a
number of legitimate aims: ensuring national security, public
safety and territorial integrity and protecting the rights and
freedoms of others. If the Court had accepted, as it had done in
the Hadjianastassiou v. Greece judgment of 16 December 1992
(Series A no. 252), that an isolated case of espionage could harm
national security, there was all the more reason to reach a
similar conclusion where, as in the instant case, the very
existence of a State Party to the Convention was threatened.
34. The applicants observed that before the Constitutional
Court Principal State Counsel had at no stage relied on either
national security or public safety.
35. The Commission considered that prohibiting activities
which, in the authorities' view, were likely to cause the collapse
of the State or the division of its territory could be said to be
intended to protect "national security" and territorial integrity.
36. The Court considers that the dissolution of the SP pursued
at least one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 11: the
protection of "national security".
(c) "Necessary in a democratic society"
i. Submissions of those appearing before the Court
(alpha) The applicants
37. The applicants said that in a pluralist democratic and
parliamentary system, people should have the right to express
their opinion on the Kurdish problem and on how to resolve it. The
SP was a political party supported by a sector of public opinion
which should have had the right to accede to power.
The SP bore no resemblance to the German Communist Party that
had been dissolved at the time by the German Federal
Constitutional Court (see application no. 250/57, Yearbook 1, p.
225). Otherwise, the Turkish Constitutional Court would not have
dismissed, on 8 December 1988, the first application for the SP to
be dissolved (see paragraph 10 above). In that decision the
Constitutional Court had found the party's constitution and
programme to be in accordance with the Constitution and that it
was part of the country's democratic system and clearly opposed
terrorism.
The SP had never acted unlawfully and the best proof of that
was that its then Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, was now Chairman of
another political party, the Workers' Party, and carried on his
work quite lawfully.
The SP had always defended the union of the Turkish State. The
federal system it proposed as a solution to the Kurdish problem
would not prevent State unity. Germany and Switzerland were
federations and no one saw in that status a programme to divide
those countries. As for Turkey, federation would, on the contrary,
afford a much more reliable solution for the future.
(beta) The Government
38. In the Government's submission, any resemblance between the
present case and that of the United Communist Party of Turkey
("the TBKP") was in appearances only, the sole real similarity
lying in the fact that both parties had been dissolved by an order
of the Constitutional Court. In the case of the TBKP the
Constitutional Court's task had been to assess whether the party's
programme and constitution complied with the Constitution and the
Law on the regulation of political parties. In the case of the SP
on the other hand - as the Constitutional Court had clearly
explained in its judgment - the court had had to assess whether
the SP's activities subsequent to its formation were consistent
with those documents.
After the first review of the constitutionality of the party
(see paragraphs 9 - 10 above), new facts and evidence had come to
light concerning the SP's activities, which the Commission, unlike
the Constitutional Court, had failed to take into account. They
showed that from 1990, and in particular in 1991, the SP's
activities had shifted radically away from its initial approach
reflected in its constitutive documents and were directed towards
the disruption of the fundamental concepts which have inspired the
Republic of Turkey since its formation.
The shift was to be seen in particular in the speeches made by
the SP's Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, at meetings, congresses or
political rallies, some of which were later published by the
party. He had used violent, aggressive and provocative language,
denigrated all the other political parties and sought to vindicate
the use of violence and terrorist methods by calling for an
uprising through the use, inter alia, of the expression "{Ayaga
kalk}", which meant "stand up". The Constitutional Court
consequently found that the language and methods of the SP were
not at all consistent with its calls for brotherhood and equality.
39. Referring to the Court's analysis of the situation in
Turkey in its judgment in the case of Zana v. Turkey of 25
November 1997 (Reports 1997-VII), the Government said that in 1990
and 1991 there had been an intolerable increase in terrorist
activity that had caused thousands of deaths and had spared
neither women nor children. Against that background, the
declarations of a well-known political leader were bound to
aggravate the violence and hatred. In such cases, the authority to
the effect that freedom of expression also applied to statements
that offended, shocked or disturbed bore no relevance. In the
present case, the Court was not concerned with a political debate
on political and economic issues of interest to the whole country,
but with incitement to join a bloody and murderous conflict
between two sections of the population which enjoyed, without any
discrimination, all the rights and liberties defined by the
Constitution and statute.
In that connection, the Government referred, as they had done
in the TBKP case (see the judgment cited above, pp. 23 - 24, з
49), to the Commission's case-law whereby if the interference
pursued as a legitimate aim the protection of public order,
territorial integrity, the public interest or democracy, the
Convention institutions did not require that the risk of violence
justifying the interference should be real, current or imminent.
Nor was it at all relevant to rely on Mr {Perincek's}
acquittals before the National Security Courts in order to contest
the necessity of the interference in issue, as two types of
proceedings, pursuing entirely different aims, were involved...
the first type was criminal proceedings, in which the court ruled
on an individual's personal responsibility, whereas in the second
type of proceedings - constitutional proceedings, such as those
impugned before the Court - the sole issue was whether a political
party was compatible with the Convention and that necessitated
applying different criteria.
(gamma) The Commission
40. The Commission considered that the SP's dissolution had not
been necessary in a democratic society. It noted that Mr
{Perincek} had previously been prosecuted in the criminal courts
for making statements to the same effect as those made in the
present case, but had been acquitted of the charges against him.
The Commission inferred that even in the eyes of the Turkish
judicial authorities, the publications did not contain anything
intended to encourage extremist or terrorist groups to destroy the
constitutional order of the State or to found a Kurdish State
through the use of force.
The Commission also observed that the SP had sought to achieve
its political aims solely through lawful means and that it had not
been shown that the SP had had any intention of destroying
Turkey's democratic and pluralist order or had advocated
infringing fundamental human rights by promoting racial
discrimination.
ii. The Court's assessment
41. The Court reiterates that notwithstanding its autonomous
role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must also be
considered in the light of Article 10. The protection of opinions
and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the
freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in Article 11.
That applies all the more in relation to political parties in view
of their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper
functioning of democracy.
As the Court has emphasised many times, there can be no
democracy without pluralism. It is for that reason that freedom of
expression as enshrined in Article 10 is applicable, subject to
paragraph 2, not only to "information" or "ideas" that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. The
fact that their activities form part of a collective exercise of
freedom of expression in itself entitles political parties to seek
the protection of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. (see,
among other authorities, the United Communist Party of Turkey and
Others judgment cited above, pp. 20 - 21, зз 42 - 43).
42. In the instant case it must first be noted that in its
judgment of 10 July 1992 the Constitutional Court held that on
that occasion it no longer had to consider whether the SP's
programme and constitution were lawful, but only whether its
political activities contravened the statutory prohibitions. In
dissolving the party, the Constitutional Court had had regard to
public statements - some of them in written form - made by Mr
{Perincek} which it considered to constitute new facts and
evidence that were binding on the SP (see paragraph 15 above).
Consequently, the Court may confine itself to examining those
statements.
43. The Constitutional Court noted that, by distinguishing two
nations - the Kurdish nation and the Turkish nation - Mr
{Perincek} had advocated the creation of minorities within Turkey
and, ultimately, the establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish
federation, to the detriment of the unity of the Turkish nation
and the territorial integrity of the State. The SP was
ideologically opposed to the nationalism of {Ataturk}, which was
the most fundamental principle underpinning the Republic of
Turkey. Although different methods were used, the aim of the SP's
political activity was similar to that of terrorist organisations.
As the SP promoted separatism and revolt its dissolution was
justified (see paragraph 15 above).
44. In the light of these factors, the Court must firstly
consider the content of the statements in issue and then determine
whether they justified the dissolution of the SP.
With regard to the first issue the Court reiterates that when
it carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own
view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to
review under Article 11 the decisions they delivered in the
exercise of their discretion. In so doing, the Court has to
satisfy itself that the national authorities based their decisions
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, mutatis
mutandis, the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment
cited above, p. 22, з 47).
45. Further, the Court has previously held that one of the
principal characteristics of democracy is the possibility it
offers of resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without
recourse to violence, even when they are irksome. Democracy
thrives on freedom of expression. From that point of view, there
can be no justification for hindering a political group solely
because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the
State's population and to take part in the nation's political life
in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable
of satisfying everyone concerned (see the United Communist Party
of Turkey and Others judgment cited above, p. 27, з 57).
46. Having analysed Mr {Perincek's} statements, the Court finds
nothing in them that can be considered a call for the use of
violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic
principles. On the contrary, he stressed on a number of occasions
the need to achieve the proposed political reform in accordance
with democratic rules, through the ballot box and by holding
referenda. At the same time, he spoke out against "the former
culture idolising violence and advocating the use of force to
solve problems between nations and in society" (see paragraph 13
above).
At the hearing the Agent for the Government stated that Mr
{Perincek} had "justified the use of violent and terrorist
methods" by saying in particular: "The Kurd has proved himself
through the fight of impoverished peasants by linking its destiny
[to theirs]. By holding meetings with thousands of people in the
towns and provinces, the Kurd had proved himself and broken down
the barriers of fear." Furthermore, by calling on those present to
"sow courage, rather than watermelons", Mr {Perincek} had, in the
Government's submission, "exhorted them to stop all activities
other than the destruction of order". Lastly, by using the phrase
"The Kurdish people are standing up" he had called upon them to
revolt.
While the Court accepts that these phrases were directed at
citizens of Kurdish origin and constituted an invitation to them
to rally together and assert certain political claims, it finds no
trace of any incitement to use violence or infringe the rules of
democracy. In that regard, the relevant statements were scarcely
any different from those made by other political groups that were
active in other countries of the Council of Europe.
47. The Constitutional Court had also criticised Mr {Perincek}
for having drawn a distinction between two nations, the Kurdish
nation and the Turkish nation, in his speeches and of thereby
pleading in favour of creating minorities and the establishment of
a Kurdish-Turkish federation, to the detriment of the unity of the
Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of the State.
Ultimately, the SP had advocated separatism.
The Court notes that, read together, the statements put forward
a political programme with the essential aim being the
establishment, in accordance with democratic rules, of a federal
system in which Turks and Kurds would be represented on an equal
footing and on a voluntary basis. Admittedly, reference is made to
the right to self-determination of the "Kurdish nation" and its
right to "secede"; however, read in their context, the statements
using these words do not encourage secession from Turkey but seek
rather to stress that the proposed federal system could not come
about without the Kurds' freely given consent, which should be
expressed through a referendum.
In the Court's view, the fact that such a political programme
is considered incompatible with the current principles and
structures of the Turkish State does not make it incompatible with
the rules of democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow
diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even
those that call into question the way a State is currently
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.
48. It is true here too that, as was the case with the TBKP
(see the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment
cited above, p. 27, з 58), it cannot be ruled out that the
statements in issue concealed objectives and intentions different
from the ones proclaimed in public. In the absence of concrete
actions belying Mr {Perincek's} sincerity in what he said,
however, that sincerity should not be doubted. The SP was thus
penalised for conduct relating solely to the exercise of freedom
of expression.
49. The Court also notes that Mr {Perincek} was acquitted in
the National Security Courts where he had been prosecuted in
respect of the same statements (see paragraph 11 above). In that
connection the Government stressed that the two types of
proceedings were entirely different, one concerning the
application of criminal law, the other the application of
constitutional law. The Court merely notes that the Turkish courts
had divergent views as to the effect of Mr {Perincek's}
statements.
It is now important to determine whether, in the light of the
above considerations, the SP's dissolution can be considered to
have been necessary in a democratic society, that is to say
whether it met a "pressing social need" and was "proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued" (see, among many other authorities and
mutatis mutandis, the Vogt v. Germany judgment of 26 September
1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 25 - 26, з 52).
50. The Court reiterates that, having regard to the essential
role of political parties in the proper functioning of democracy
(see the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment
cited above, p. 17, з 25), the exceptions set out in Article 11
are, where political parties are concerned, to be construed
strictly; only convincing and compelling reasons can justify
restrictions on such parties' freedom of association. In
determining whether a necessity within the meaning of Article 11 з
2 exists, the Contracting States have only a limited margin of
appreciation, which goes hand in hand with rigorous European
supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying it,
including those given by independent courts (see the United
Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment cited above, p. 22,
з 46).
51. The Court observes that the interference in question was
radical... the SP was dissolved with immediate and permanent
effect, its assets were liquidated and transferred ipso jure to
the Treasury and its leaders - who admittedly did not include Mr
{Perincek} when the party was dissolved (see paragraph 14 above) -
were banned from carrying on certain similar political activities.
Measures as severe as those may only be applied in the most
serious cases.
52. The Court has already noted that Mr {Perincek's}
statements, though critical and full of demands, did not appear to
it to call into question the need for compliance with democratic
principles and rules.
The Court is prepared to take into account the background of
cases before it, in particular the difficulties associated with
the prevention of terrorism (see, among other authorities, the
United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment cited above,
p. 27, з 59). In the present case, however, it has not been
established how, in spite of the fact that in making them their
author declared attachment to democracy and expressed rejection of
violence, the statements in issue could be considered to have been
in any way responsible for the problems which terrorism poses in
Turkey.
53. In view of the findings referred to above, there is no need
either to bring Article 17 into play, as nothing in the statements
warrants the conclusion that their author relied on the Convention
to engage in activity or perform acts aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth in it (see, mutatis
mutandis, the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment
cited above, p. 27, з 60).
54. In conclusion, the dissolution of the SP was
disproportionate to the aim pursued and consequently unnecessary
in a democratic society. It follows that there has been a
violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
II. Alleged violations of Articles 9, 10, 14
and 18 of the Convention
55. The applicants also maintained that there had been breaches
of Articles 9, 10, 14 and 18 of the Convention. As their
complaints relate to the same facts the Court considers it
unnecessary to examine them separately.
III. Alleged violations of Articles 1 and 3
of Protocol no. 1
56. The applicants further submitted that the effects of the
SP's dissolution - its assets were confiscated and transferred to
the Treasury, and its leaders were banned from taking part in
elections - entailed a breach of Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No.
1, which provide:
Article 1
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties."
Article 3
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections
at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in
the choice of the legislature."
57. The Court notes that the measures complained of by the
applicants were incidental effects of the SP's dissolution, which
the Court has held to amount to a breach of Article 11. It is
consequently unnecessary to consider those complaints separately.
IV. Alleged violation of Article 6 з 1
of the Convention
58. Lastly, the applicants complained that instead of holding a
public hearing, the Constitutional Court had heard them merely in
camera and that they had not had access to the case file or the
verbatim record of the hearing. They considered that that amounted
to a breach of Article 6 з 1 of the Convention.
59. Neither the Government nor the Commission considered that
Article 6 з 1 was applicable on the facts of the case.
60. In view of its conclusion concerning compliance with
Article 11, the Court considers that it is unnecessary to examine
this complaint.
V. Application of Article 50 of the Convention
61. Article 50 of the Convention provides:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
A. Annulment of the order for dissolution
62. The applicants firstly requested the annulment of the
Constitutional Court's order of 10 July 1992 dissolving the SP.
They also sought "recognised political-party status" for the SP.
63. The Court holds that it has no jurisdiction under the
Convention to order these measures (see, mutatis mutandis, the
Saidi v. France judgment of 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C,
p. 57, з 47).
B. Damage and costs and expenses
64. In respect of pecuniary damage the applicants claimed
1,500,000 US dollars (USD): USD 1,000,000 for the SP and USD
250,000 each for Mr {Dogu Perincek} and Mr {Ilhan Kirit}. They
sought USD 6,000,000 for nonpecuniary damage, that is USD
2,000,000 for each applicant.
In support of their claims they stressed that the SP had had
more than 400 offices spread over the whole of Turkey, all its
assets had been seized, it had had the right to present candidates
at the elections, had taken part in the elections and was the only
left-wing socialist party in existence when it was dissolved.
According to the applicants, the thousands of people who had
helped to form the SP - which had been active for four years
before its dissolution - and the leaders of that party had
sustained substantial nonpecuniary damage and financial loss.
The applicants also sought "reimbursement of all the costs to
which the case had given rise". At the hearing before the Court,
they explained that the fees and costs of the 308 lawyers who had
represented the SP before the Constitutional Court alone had come
to 1,955,800 French francs (FRF). As to the costs of the
applicants' representation before the Convention institutions,
they had come to FRF 300,000.
65. As its main submission, the Government considered that no
compensation was payable in this case. In the alternative, they
considered the applicants' claims exorbitant. In the further
alternative, they argued that a violation of Article 11 only could
not confer on the applicants a right to be compensated
individually.
As to the alleged pecuniary damage, the Government affirmed
that it had no causal link with the SP's dissolution, that
political parties and their leaders could not be equated with
commercial undertakings and that in any event there was no
supporting accounting evidence for the claims.
As for the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the
Government considered them to be "even more unreliable" since not
only were they exorbitant but they included a claim for non-
pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the SP itself.
Lastly, as regards the claims for costs and expenses, the
Government found them to be insufficiently detailed.
66. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that the
applicants' presentation - which was very general and hypothetical
- was insufficient to allow their claims under Article 50 to be
upheld.
67. The Court notes that the applicants have not furnished any
evidence in support of their claims for substantial sums in
respect of pecuniary damage and costs and expenses. Consequently,
it cannot uphold those claims (see, mutatis mutandis, the Pressos
Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 3 July
1997 (Article 50), Reports 1997-IV, p. 1299, з 24). It notes,
however, that the applicants received FRF 57,187 in legal aid paid
by the Council of Europe.
As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court notes that, unlike the
TBKP, the SP's constitution and programme were approved by the
Constitutional Court and the party was active for four years
before being dissolved by it. Mr {Perincek} and Mr {Kirit}
therefore sustained definite non-pecuniary damage. Making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court assesses that damage
at FRF 50,000 each.
C. Default interest
68. According to the information available to the Court, the
statutory rate of interest applicable in France at the date of
adoption of the present judgment is 3.36% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the
Convention;
2. Holds that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has
been a violation of Articles 6 з 1, 9, 10, 14 and 18 of the
Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay Mr {Perincek} and Mr
{Kirit}, within three months, a total sum of 50,000 (fifty
thousand) French francs each in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the
date of payment;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 3.36% shall be
payable on that sum from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing
in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 May 1998.
Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
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